

SCIENCES ✓

THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK



THE JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS



MARCH, 1954

Volume 8. No. 1.

QUARTERLY

R v. 8 1954

THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Australian Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial non-political body established in 1933 for the scientific study of international affairs. The Institute is affiliated to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and constitutes the Australian National Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The chief office-bearers of the Institute are:—

<i>Visitor</i>	- - - - -	His Excellency The Governor-General
<i>President</i>	- - - - -	Mr. T. N. M. Buesst
<i>Vice-Presidents</i>	- - - - -	Mr. H. D. Black Professor Gordon Greenwood Mr. N. D. Harper Mr. Ross Hohnen Mr. Brian Hunter Professor T. Hytten The Hon. Mr. Justice Virtue
<i>Hon. Treasurer</i>	- - - - -	Mr. Allan R. Henderson
<i>Hon. Secretary</i>	- - - - -	Mr. K. A. Aickin
<i>Chairman of Research Committee</i>	- - - - -	Professor G. Greenwood

The addresses of the Branches are:—

<i>The Secretary A.I.I.A.</i> 177 Collins Street, Melbourne	<i>Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.</i> Dept. of History, University of Tasmania, Hobart
<i>Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.</i> 232 George Street, Brisbane	<i>The Secretary A.I.I.A.</i> 369 George Street, Sydney
<i>Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.</i> Armidale Group, New England University College, Armidale, N.S.W.	<i>Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.</i> c/o Dept. of Territories, Canberra, A.C.T.
<i>Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.</i> Exchange Building, 26 Pirie Street, Adelaide	<i>Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.</i> c/o Public Library, Perth

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

"The Australian Outlook" is published in March, June, September and December in each year. Subscription rates: in Australia £1 a year or 5/- a copy; in the U.K. 16/- a year; in U.S.A. \$2.25 a year.

Overseas subscriptions may be placed with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York, 22 N.Y.

All communications should be addressed to the Commonwealth Secretary, The Australian Institute of International Affairs, 177 Collins St., Melbourne.

Monday: Mr. and Mrs. [REDACTED] called. They are going abroad for six months so that Mr. [REDACTED] can study latest developments in his field.




World travellers start off on the right foot

Every year, the "Wales" gives thousands of travellers specialized free travel service. So I arranged for the Bank's travel department to book my customers' passages and make their hotel reservations. I also supplied them with a circular letter of credit and travellers' cheques. These will save them the risk of carrying too much money in cash. Wherever you go, you, too, can ensure trouble-free travel if you consult and use —



(INCORPORATED IN NEW SOUTH WALES WITH LIMITED LIABILITY)



THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

Vol. 8. No. 1

March, 1954

CONTENTS

Articles

- The Crown - - - - *The Rt. Hon. Sir John Latham G.C.M.G.* 1
British Attitudes Towards Asia - - - - - *J. D. B. Miller* 4
Drafting a Constitution for a
European Community (Part 1) - - - - *W. A. Townsley* 14
Soviet Local Government and Democracy - - - - *T. H. Rigby* 19
Australia at War — The Political Story (Review Article) *T. I. Moore* 32

Notes

- Full Employment in International Affairs - - - *R. H. Byrnes* 44
Naguib: A Study in Loyalty - - - - - *Maurice Adams* 50
Conference at New York, October 20-31, 1953 - *T. N. M. Buesst* 54

Book Reviews

- The South Seas in Transition (W. E. H. Stanner) - *Douglas Oliver* 57
Social Anthropology in Melanesia (A. P. Elkin) - *Adrian Mayer* 61
The Australian Way of Life - - - - - *H. D. Black* 63

Institute News

- Editorial Notes - - - - - 64

EDITOR: H. D. Black.

ASSISTANT EDITOR: O. A. Guth.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS: K. A. Aickin (Victoria), N. R. Collins (Western Australia),
D. G. McFarling (South Australia), H. Mayer (New South Wales), T. Inglis Moore
(Canberra), R. G. Neale (Queensland), W. A. Townsley (Tasmania).

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Articles

THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN LATHAM, G.C.M.G.: Ex-Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.

J. D. B. MILLER: Senior Staff Tutor, Department of Tutorial Classes, University of Sydney, at present studying in Great Britain.

W. A. TOWNSLEY: Senior Lecturer in History and Political Science, University of Tasmania.

T. H. RIGBY: Who is reading for a Ph.D. at London School of Economics.

T. I. MOORE: Senior Lecturer in Pacific Studies, Canberra University College.

Notes

MAURICE ADAMS: Former Reuters Correspondent in Cairo.

T. N. M. BUESST: President, Australian Institute of International Affairs.

R. H. BYRNES: Secretary, Canberra Branch A.I.I.A.

Reviews

DOUGLAS OLIVER: Department of Anthropology, Harvard University.

ADRIAN MAYER: Australian National University.

H. D. BLACK: Editor, *The Australian Outlook*.

March, 1954

The Crown

By Sir John Latham

The republican impulse of the American revolution and the French Revolution surged through North and South America, but it did not conquer the world. Monarchy maintained itself in Europe, except in France, and Switzerland remained a republic. But after 1914 kings and thrones were in the discard — in Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, Russia, and the Balkan States except Greece. In Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Denmark the institution of monarchy was reconciled with parliamentary democracy. In the British Commonwealth it has been reconciled also with a political union of independent democracies and dependent countries, aiming at the objective of determining policy in matters of common concern after consultation with each other. In relatively undeveloped Asiatic countries monarchy continues — sometimes upon a precarious basis.

In mediæval days the king was, in Shakespeare's phrase, regarded as "the anointed deputy of heaven"—a representative of God upon earth. The kings modelled themselves upon oriental potentates and Roman Emperors. The people, who needed a leader and a powerful protector, were generally willing to be the subjects of a God-given ruler who was an autocrat. Sometimes a Mayor of the Palace or a Shogun in practice exercised the powers of government, but he professed to be acting merely for the monarch. The subjects of a king went to war when he decided, for any reason whatever, to go to war, and they made peace when he decided to make peace. The courts of the kings consisted largely of obsequious and servile flatterers. Until the rise of the merchant class success in life, except in the military and ecclesiastical arenas, generally depended upon the favour of a monarch who might be, and often was, a stupid and selfish man. The doctrine of the divine right of kings did not disappear from England with the execution of Charles I. A book by Sir Robert Filmer was published in 1680, and it became very popular. It bore a striking title—"Patriarcha or A Defence of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People". But the doctrine was little heard of in England after the end of the Stuart regime in 1688, when the omnipotence of Parliament, regarded as representing the people, was established.

It is only in Russia during the reigns of Lenin and Stalin that there has been any modern example of what amounts in practice to the worship of a ruler.

The history of the kings and queens of England has been full of vicissitude — of success and failure, of victory and defeat, of high patriotism and low cunning. After the succession to the throne had been settled in the House of Hanover, the monarchy ran downhill during the reigns of the four Georges and William IV. Queen Victoria re-established it. Her personal and domestic virtues provided a welcome contrast with the opposite qualities of several of her predecessors. She had much common-sense, though the modern mind is out of sympathy with her preoccupation with personal and domestic relationships in the determination of policy.

George V, by his robust commonsense, his patriotism, his valuable, because limited and careful, use of personal influence, and by ultimate action in accordance with the advice of the ministers who controlled the House of Commons, did a great deal to establish the monarchy firmly in the regard of the people. George VI, reluctantly obeying a summons to duties which he had never contemplated, carried on the honourable tradition of his father.

The system of limited constitutional monarchy has proved to be, not only stable, but also capable of adaptation to changing conditions. The Crown is the Executive of the State, acting on behalf of the whole of the people. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia provides in section 61 "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative". The Queen is also an essential part of the Legislature. Section 1 of the Constitution provides "The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives". The Queen, through the Governor-General, acts upon the advice of her ministers, who are responsible to Parliament, and, through Parliament, to the people, for the advice which they give.

The hereditary monarchy of what has become the British Commonwealth of Nations is a practical solution of the very difficult problem of selecting the head of a state. The alternative is some system of election, with the probable consequence that the leader of a party, holding office for a short period, becomes the head of the state. There are both advantages and disadvantages in such a system. During the Democratic presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, not a few Republicans in the United States would refuse to rise to the toast of "The President of the United States". The

March, 1954

hereditary monarchy provides a non-party leader of the people specially trained for the discharge of public duties. A worthy occupant of this high office will gain the true allegiance and loyalty of the people as a whole, and the institution will remain as long as the standards to which we have been accustomed are maintained.

The pageant of the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II attracted the eager attention of hundreds of millions of people in many countries. The distinguished historian Mr. A. L. Rowse tells us that the ceremonial of the Coronation has remained essentially the same for about 1000 years—from the coronation of King Edgar in 973 to that of Elizabeth II in 1953. Such historical continuity appeals to the imagination.

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II represents the unity of her people—a unity which transcends all their divisions—political, social, religious, and economic. She has won affection as well as respect. She has shown that she can give leadership and inspiration. It is safe to say that her reign will not be marked—or marred—by any attempt to exercise despotic power in the old and now abandoned tradition. Everything shows that it will be distinguished alike by high intelligence and by dedicated devotion to the well-being of her many and varied peoples.

British Attitudes Towards Asia

By J. D. B. Miller

ANYONE essaying to discuss "attitudes" is immediately liable to the question, "whose attitudes?"; and lecturers on international relations know only too well the unhappy position of being told that the attitudes which they are describing are only the attitudes of the foreign offices or the newspapers or the "ruling classes" of the countries concerned; "the people don't think that way." There is no answer to this assault, since nothing will convince the interjector that he is wrong. The qualified answer, that these are the attitudes which have been publicly expressed, or which seem to be influential in the making of policy, is a reasonable one so far as it goes. But it is open to the objection that such attitudes often change under the stress of circumstances, and are hardly to be treated as determinants of policy. So I hope that what follows will be read, subject to two qualifications: that it is concerned only with attitudes as expressed by politicians, newspapers, organised groups of various kinds, and does not pretend to express what the "people" of Britain think about Asia (if they think at all in this connection); and that the attitudes are likely to change quickly under pressure of circumstances. An Australian coming to Britain finds that much less space is given to Asia and the Pacific, in newspapers and other organs of public opinion, than he might have expected. The spotlight falls most often on Europe, the Middle East and Africa — with increasing frequency on the last of these. There are fairly frequent references to India and Pakistan, intermittent references to Indo-China (but always in the context of French affairs, since the reports and comment usually come through Paris), occasional references to Burma (as when the military agreement between Britain and Burma was being discussed), hardly any references to Indonesia. China is discussed from time to time, reports coming mostly through Hong Kong and being seen through the eyes and interests of that colony. Japan hardly gets a mention except in the context of trade relations and her threat to British markets. Malaya gets a fairly good Press, since it is a British colony, with substantial British investment, and plays an important part in dollar trade. Australia and New Zealand are discussed in the context of world politics, but rarely in terms of their own problems, unless they are being visited by H.M. the Queen or Mr. Butler — and then only in the most cursory terms. In short, the general picture of Asia and the Far East is of a vast area which is a long way away, in which Britain has certain narrowly-defined interests but in which she has given up most of her former concerns — which, in short, she used to worry about but need bother about only occasionally now. In contrast are Africa, where one colony after another is in turmoil or

March, 1954

confusion and where the problem of the colour bar — today's major pre-occupation for the Left Book Club type of mind — is seen in its agonising and menacing fullness; the Middle East, a traditional field of interest, where President Naguib attracts around him British journalists of all opinions, squatting like satiated flies about the edge of a honeypot; and, above all, Europe, where the problem of Germany dwarfs all other problems for the moment and where France is a constant source of worry and doubt. It is against this general background of interest in countries closer at hand that one may seek to discover some of the divergent British attitudes towards certain definable Asian topics. The topics I have chosen are Asian Nationalism, India and Pakistan, Japan and China. Examining each of these in turn, one fact will, I think, emerge clearly — that one cannot adequately discuss British attitudes towards Asia without discussing British attitudes towards the United States of America.

There is a fairly widespread British attitude towards Asian nationalism, and it is unanimously held by most people who discuss Asian affairs: they may, and do, differ about interpretations, but their basic attitudes are the same. They all assume that there are not only separate "nationalisms" in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma and the other free countries of Asia, but also a general sense of what "The Times" calls, for want of a better term, "Asianism". Despite the conflicts which exist between various Asian countries, "the proofs of the existence of a common Asian point of view are overwhelming. At every meeting of the United Nations the activities of the Arab-Asian bloc reveal a sense of shared interest among the countries composing it which transcends race, religion and language . . . Nor does its operation confine itself to the great international gatherings in New York. It is constantly at work from the three centres of Peking, Delhi and Karachi . . . The ordinary machinery of diplomatic intercourse between Asian countries is being steadily supplemented by a series of goodwill missions, cultural conferences, and — within its limits — by the pooling of trained skills encouraged by the Colombo plan. Further, apart altogether from these activities at governmental level, there is growing up in Asian countries a new popular literature, born of national consciousness and encouraged by the approach of radio to those classes of society not yet touched by sweeping drives to banish illiteracy, which has as its themes the brotherhood of Asian peoples, and their protest against western racial arrogance in any part of the world."¹

This view is the starting-point from which British discussions of Asian affairs begin. Before considering where opinions part company, it is necessary to make the point that already, in taking this for granted, British attitudes are at variance with important attitudes in the U.S.A.

1. "The Times," leader on "The Asian Powers," 2.12.1953.

When Senator Knowland returned from Asia in October 1953, to state publicly that President Syngman Rhee and Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek were the real leaders of "free Asia," he expressed a view which most British people regard as simply untrue. "The Times" commented: "Senator Knowland speaks more in sorrow than in anger about Mr. Nehru, but he is at pains to give warning against assumptions that the Indian leader is the spokesman of all Asia. It can hardly be denied, however, that Mr. Nehru speaks for the vast masses of Asians emerging from colonial rule who have, on the international stage, no other voice to follow except that of Communist China or Soviet Russia. The choice as it appears to resurgent Asia is not between Mr. Nehru and President Eisenhower but between Mr. Nehru and Mao Tse-tung. As the only non-Communist Asian voice that can reach round the world, Mr. Nehru carries weight, and Senator Knowland's enumeration, in an effort to minimise Mr. Nehru's influence, of all the military divisions behind President Rhee and General Chiang Kai-shek does not in any way weaken the authenticity or power of what Mr. Nehru has to say."¹

This too would receive general acclaim, despite Mr. Nehru's intransigence over Kashmir and his objections to American military aid to Pakistan. It is a firmly fixed British doctrine that there are enough common elements in Asian nationalism to make it one voice in certain circumstances, and that these elements are common to Chinese communism and to the parliamentary-type democracies of South and South-East Asia. This view is close enough to the Owen Lattimore thesis² to make it anathema to Republicans in America and also to the crop of post-Lattimore American experts on Asian affairs. In their view it is either British machiavellianism, employed to cover up the "soft" British attitude towards Communist China, or simply a dangerous mistake which leads to too great respect being paid to the views of Mr. Nehru. Yet it may be said on behalf of the British view that, while it is largely based upon contact with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya, it is accurate so far as those countries go, and it is true of ex-colonial opinion generally. The American objection to it is less on the ground of its being true, as of its being approved by the British; on the whole, American opinion seems to be that, even if the state of Asian opinion is like this, it ought not to be, and that the British ought to agree that it ought not to be. The British find it hard to believe that ex-colonial opinion is likely to be any different in Asia from the growing colonial opinion which they have to face in their African colonies and the French in theirs. As well, it is, I think, fair to remark that many British people feel strong sympathy with "Asianism" because they are either ashamed of their country's colonial

1. "The Times," leader on "Senator Knowland's Far East," 28.10.1953.

2. As expressed, for example, in "The Situation in Asia."

March, 1954

past or believe that, while Britain acted honourably in India, Burma and Ceylon, she stayed longer than she should have.¹ There is a general feeling that Asia now has a right to handle its own affairs, and that it has a right to complain about the treatment it got from Europe—though this feeling tends to be replaced by impatience in many British minds when they are shown evidence of Asian confusion, indecisiveness, corruption and unwillingness to get down to the job. However strong this impatience may become, it is unlikely to deflect British opinion away from the viewpoint of "The Times," as quoted above, and towards that of Senator Knowland.

Where, then, do we find divergences in British attitudes towards Asian nationalism? On the whole, they are few, centring round the degree of responsibility to be assigned to Communism for events in Asia now. The extreme Left Wing of the Labour Party assumes that there is one "Asian revolution" and one only, and that any talk about Communism as a causal factor is "McCarthyism" or stupidity.² Right-wing Labour does not go so far as this, since it had the responsibility of handling a Communist revolt in Malaya, but it is extremely ready to believe that Chinese Communism, because of its strong nationalist element, is "Titoist" and can be separated from Russian Communism. Conservative and Liberal speakers and writers tend to stress the Communist element rather more, but none of them with the same power as would be used by their counterparts in the United States. Even in these cases, great stress is laid on the explosive power of nationalism in Asia, and the need to treat it with dignity and care. It is noteworthy that attention is nearly always directed towards those Asian countries which are members of the Commonwealth; and it may be that this emotional link, together with the fact that so many of the people who discuss Asian affairs served in one capacity or another in India, causes some lack of balance in British views of Asian nationalism.³ British attitudes towards India and Pakistan merit more consideration.

1. To some extent this view is mirrored in Professor Toynbee's Reith lectures for 1952. "The World and the West," though there it is linked with the failure of Western religion to establish itself in Asia. The recent success of Sardar K. M. Panikkar's "Asia and Western Dominance" is a symptom of British sympathy with "Asianism".
2. The writer attended several public meetings organised by a body called the "Peace with China Council" when the Korean truce negotiations were in progress. They were addressed by such speakers as Messrs. Aneurin Bevan, R. H. S. Crossman, Kingsley Martin and Emrys Hughes, and were an exciting experience. The main line of argument was that what had happened in China was simply a local variation of what had happened in India, and that all that was needed to make China as amenable as India was to treat her in the same way: the details were not specified. When a speaker said "Nehru" the whole hall cheered (with the exception of a Pakistani speaker, uncomfortably isolated on the platform where he had been saying that all Asia believed in Peace), and when one said "Chiang Kai-shek" the whole hall booed. The mood of the meeting was vintage Midlothian. If the writer may hazard an opinion, the feeling for "captive peoples struggling to be free" is the aspect of Gladstonian liberalism that wears best in Britain; and it wears surprisingly well, considering how shabby the other aspects have become.
3. Though note an interesting article by Guy Wint, "Lesson from the Philippines," in New Commonwealth, 7.12.1953.

Here the division between the two main parties is sometimes visible: Labour takes much credit for freeing India and Pakistan, and for the fact that both countries have remained within the Commonwealth, while the Conservatives tend to be rather more sceptical about Mr. Nehru as a leader. But this party division is more of sentiment than policy. No-one, for example, proposes that Britain should take sides in the Kashmir dispute, although many ex-officers of the Indian Army have an emotional bias towards Pakistan, and Socialists support Mr. Nehru so strongly as a person. Inevitably, India's size and leadership give her more space in the papers than Pakistan, though the increasing strategic importance of Pakistan has given her more prominence from the middle of 1953 onwards. The main importance of the two countries, however, is the fact that they have remained within the Commonwealth; and this is seen to be a great advantage for Britain, since it is held to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the British system is basically so liberal in intention and performance, that even ex-colonies bitterly opposed to the continuation of colonialism elsewhere are prepared to remain in co-operation with Britain in the peculiar organisation called "the Commonwealth." This, it is held, gives Britain added prestige in Europe and the U.S.A., even though it does not necessarily add to Britain's bargaining strength. Two consequences seem to me to follow. The first is that, with Britain so anxious to retain India and Pakistan in the Commonwealth, the forms and functions of the Commonwealth are, where necessary, tailored to suit those two countries, and particularly India. "The acid test for true Commonwealth believers used to be 'Will Smuts approve?'; for some of them it has now become 'Will Nehru be angry?'"¹ This is the principal reason why the habits of the "Balfour Commonwealth" or the "white Commonwealth" of the 1930s are no longer applicable to Commonwealth affairs: no allegiance to the Crown, no regular "Imperial" conferences, the dropping of the word "British" from references to the Commonwealth, are all attempts to make the club more comfortable for the new members. Just how far British Governments are prepared to alter foreign and colonial policy in order to accommodate Indian and Pakistani views is a question still unsettled. In regard to South Africa, the area of immediate conflict, Britain has pursued a policy of extreme caution, in the sense that she refuses to back Indian attacks against South Africa at the United Nations, but also refuses to hand over the Protectorates (Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland) to South Africa and at the same time perpetuates her discrimination against Seretse Khama. My guess would be that British opinion generally would rather see India in the Commonwealth than South Africa, if it came to a decision. Apart from the practical advantages of Indian friendship in connection with such colonies as

1. "Mr. Dulles and Mr. Nehru" in *"The Economist"*, 9.1.1954.

March, 1954

Kenya and Malaya, the Commonwealth at present can be justly praised as a "multi-racial" organisation in a world where racial discrimination is attracting more and more obloquy: Indian defection would damage this claim, South African defection improve it. In the general field of ideology, then, Britain's advantage is served by retaining India and Pakistan and Ceylon in the Commonwealth as long as possible.¹

The second consequence which follows from the importance attached to the continued membership of India and Pakistan in the Commonwealth is the effect upon British policy at the United Nations. The nomination of India to the political conference on Korea, against the wishes of the United States, was the first occasion on which Britain had seemed inclined to value Indian goodwill more than American in a critical situation. There is no point in discussing the rightness or wrongness of the action;² what is important here is the fact that it was taken, and that India was the country in question. To a large extent the decision was a reflection of British anxiety to get the war in Korea finished, and to show the Russians that the West was not solidly behind the American policy for Korea. But it was also designed to show Asian countries that Britain was prepared not only to discuss but also to back representative "Asian" opinion on what was essentially an Asian question, and to give a demonstration of how the Commonwealth relationship could function in the context of high policy at the United Nations. In all these aims it seems to have been successful. One may assume that British policy will, wherever possible, defer to Indian wishes in cases where British interests are not in danger. However, the "neutralism" which has been characteristic of Indian policy does not square with British attachment to NATO and to American policy in Europe. There is fairly widespread recognition amongst British policy-makers that Britain's close connection with India confirms the opinion of many Americans that Britain is neutralist too. Their answer to this is that the U.S.A. has had no success in trying to woo India, that it is "ham-fisted" (an adjective, frequently used, which adequately covers British opinion of American foreign policy generally) in its attempts to detach India from friendship with Communist China, and that only by building up a sense of mutual confidence between India and Britain can the balance be kept in Asia. To suggest this is, of course, to leave Pakistan out of account, or rather to assume that close connection with India will not alienate Pakistan. Perhaps it is fair to sum up the prevalent British attitude towards India and Pakistan by saying that Britain needs peace in Asia if she is to fulfil her military commitments in Europe

1. I do not neglect the influence of the vast amount of profitable British capital invested in South Africa, the safety of which could conceivably be endangered if South Africa left the Commonwealth in a huff. And I am well aware that large numbers of white South Africans cling to Britain.

2. See an excellent debate on it by G. F. Hudson and Sebastian Haffner, "The Anglo-American Quarrel," *"Twentieth Century,"* October, 1953.

and, at the same time, attempt some of the ambitious schemes of overseas investment which all her political parties endorse; and she judges that co-operation with India (though only on Asian affairs) will ensure this, and is worth risking disagreement with the United States.

In discussing Japan, one finds little or no interest amongst people in Britain, apart from commercial considerations. Japan is so far away; she does not fit into any of the convenient theories about the "Asian revolution," except in the broadest and least useful sense; she was an American, not a joint, responsibility after the war, and so tended to drop out of British reckoning; she is a ruthless competitor with some of Britain's most vulnerable export industries, whose competition has been masked since 1939 but is now emerging once more; and it is perhaps not too fanciful to say that she is a source of embarrassment because, having been a former ally and a pivot of British policy in the Pacific, she bit the hand that fed her. So far as I can see, no one in Britain has a policy towards Japan, except the hope that she will find large markets in China and not become too insistent a competitor in British colonies and in South-East Asia. As noted above, she rarely appears in the newspapers except in her commercial context.¹ Her domestic problems of food, politics and culture are hardly ever discussed. She does not find a place in the expansive Asian theories of the Left Wing, except as a puppet of American policy or a lurking semi-fascist threat. This may be connected with the fact that she seems to have no place either in the "Asianism" of which Mr. Nehru is the expositor: the most powerful industrial state in Asia and potentially the strongest military power, Japan is an enigma and a source of obscurantism. Yet it must be clear that any theories and policies on Asia which neglect Japan are necessarily short-term and superficial. All sections of British opinion maintain a Micawber policy towards Japan: they hope that something will turn up to feed the Japanese and assuage their national ambitions. American occupation and the Korean war provided what was necessary up to 1953. Perhaps something will turn up in 1954.

China is the issue over which American and British policy differs most clearly, since it is here that a clear point of division, the recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, comes between them. On the point of recognition, "The British view is that to extend recognition to a government is a question of fact, implying neither praise nor blame for the government recognised. A government which is in effective control of the country it claims to speak for, and which is capable of fulfilling its normal international obligations, deserves to be treated as the effective government of that country. From this it follows that recognition should not be offered

1. Exception should be made in the case of the excellent articles on aspects of Japanese life which appear from time to time in the "Manchester Guardian". They are written by Hessel Tiltman.

March, 1954

as a reward for good behaviour or withdrawn as a punishment for bad behaviour. Recognition can also rarely be used with any profit as a counter in diplomatic bargaining. In so far as diplomacy is the art of reconciling differences of opinion, diplomatic representation becomes increasingly valuable the more differences there are to be reconciled. To many Americans this point of view appears cynical or even immoral. They distinguish between the characters as well as the capacities of foreign regimes, and believe that recognition should be judged by ethical in addition to practical tests."¹

This view is, so far as I know, supported by all sections of British opinion. No one proposes to withdraw British recognition of Peking, even though the Chinese Communists are not represented in London. The differences between Britain and the U.S.A. run deeper, however, than differences over the nature of diplomatic recognition. There is a widespread British attitude, common to all opinions except a few to the extreme Left and Right, which has been stated thus by Sebastian Haffner:

"Britain, of course, no less than America, rejects Communism . . . as a political and economic formula for the management of her own affairs; and Britain no less than America recognises that Communist parties in other countries are often used as agents for the extension of Russian power and have, from this point of view, to be watched with vigilant care. But Britain, unlike America, does not see the whole of present international life dominated by an ideological struggle between Communism and anti-Communism, and she cannot make the containment of Communism the over-riding principle of her foreign policy. Still less can she regard the subversion of established governments, whether Communist or not, as a legitimate aim of the foreign policy of any country . . . Moreover, it is a British belief that, wherever Communist Governments are in power outside Russia, the natural and inescapable pressure of the national interests of these countries constantly militates against their fond belief that the interests of all Communist governments are automatically identical; and that an objective and businesslike relationship with them, based on strict considerations of interest, is the best means of aiding that pressure."²

This is a general attitude towards Communism which owes something, no doubt, to the comic-opera character of the British Communist Party and the tendency of British people to assume that other Communist parties are just as ineffective and disorganised as the one with which they are familiar. It arises also from traditional British reluctance to believe that foreign policy is based upon other grounds than strategic interests, colonial demands, commercial interests or, perhaps, race and religion. Whereas American minds have taken enthusiastically, in horrific comprehension,

1. "The Times" leader on "Recognition," 29.9.1953.

2. "Twentieth Century," op. cit.

to the Leninist notion of a world-wide conspiracy of revolutionary parties, and have based their opposition to Communism on their belief that it can effectively put such a notion into operation, British minds have refused to believe that the notion can be effective on anything more than a regional or national scale—and not particularly effective then, unless local conditions of poverty or inflamed nationalism give it material to work on. China is the crux of this argument. British writers lay most of their stress upon the independent success of the Chinese Communists and their refusal to obey Stalin's orders at various times.¹ It is widely believed that Chinese Communism is "different," that Russia has no chance of dominating China, that there is no clear evidence of Chinese instigation of Communist revolts in South East Asia, that China entered the Korean war only because she was provoked by the Americans, and that Chiang Kai-shek has been rejected by the Chinese people and stands no chance of being welcomed back. These are the commonplaces of British discussions of China. Neither Right nor Left question them, although some Conservatives question the wisdom of appeasing the Communist government if this means offending the United States. There is widespread agreement that a war with China would be suicidal. The frequent American suggestion that British attitudes are dictated by the desire to hang on to Hong Kong is, if at all correct, correct in only a small degree. A good deal of British money is invested in Hong Kong but no one is prepared to fight a full-scale war to preserve it. The British feeling that war with China would be useless folly is extremely strong. The Asian members of the Commonwealth would be against it; Britain would not have the forces to fight it; it would cause more trouble in Malaya and Indo-China; and it would have untold repercussions in Europe. To take this view, one does not need to think of China as Communist at all; one has only to think of it as China. But as a Communist state with a working alliance with Russia, China is even less attractive as an opponent for Britain. The more excited Americans become about China, the more apprehensive and nervous the British become. "The wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy"—that is British feeling exactly. And when to it is joined a profound scepticism about the necessity to attack Communism as such, one can see why, and how, British attitudes towards China have become so solid. Nevertheless, there is room for divergence. This arises less from diagnosis of the situation than from decision on what to do about it. There is pressure from the extreme Left for increased trade with China and for

1. See, for example, Sir David Kelly's review of Max Beloff's *Soviet Policy in the Far East* in "The Sunday Times," 25.10.1953, and the article "China and Russia: Historical Reasons for Party differences" in "The Times," 4.1.1954. It should be made clear that neither of these articles postulates a Chinese "Titoism", but both stress very different points about the Chinese Communists from those which would be stressed by similar writers in comparable American publications.

March, 1954

a repudiation of Chiang Kai-shek and a declaration that in no circumstances will Britain assist American attacks on China. Opinions further to the Right agree, more or less cautiously, that trade with China is desirable if it can be arranged (a big "if," since China has not much to contribute), but object to declarations which might further complicate Britain's position in Asia and her relations with the United States. "Wait and see" is the general attitude, coupled with "watch and pray" that the Americans do not pull the wrong string at the wrong time. Even at its most cautious, this policy is not likely to please the Americans, and is easily mistranslated into blind fear about Hong Kong.

In general, one may describe British attitudes towards Asia as agreeing that some sort of general revolt against the European has taken place, with which it is better to be in accord than at odds; that Asian nationalism has common elements which occur in Communist as well as non-Communist countries; that the adhesion of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to the Commonwealth is worth preserving, if at all possible; that contact should be maintained with Communist China, in the hope of peace in Asia and the possible detachment of China from Russia; that war should not be declared on Communism, as such, but upon aggressive Communism in certain instances, for its aggression rather than its Communism; and that Japan can be fitted into no pattern. At the extreme Left of the political spectrum¹ there is much more enthusiasm and optimism about Asia than on the extreme Right. The Left feels that Asia is an endorsement of the views of those who wish to see imperialism quickly slain, since India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma retain friendship with Britain after being allowed to relinquish voluntarily their imperial bonds. It also feels that Asia shows the need to tackle poverty instead of preparing for war, and the desire of Asians to practice democracy if it is accompanied by practical Socialism. To the extreme Right, Asia is a warning against further instalments of "scuttle," since, although India and the other freed nations are friendly to Britain, "Indianisation," "Ceylonisation" and the like go on apace, and there is less and less room for the English civil servant or businessman in these countries. The Right also feels apprehensive about China, and pessimistic about the future in Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo. In general, the two extremes unite in their desire not to interfere in Asian affairs unless specifically requested to. In between them are the front benches of the two great political parties, separated in sentiment towards Asia but remarkably alike in policy: anyone who can find significant differences in the Asian policies of the Attlee and Churchill Governments deserves a prize.

1. Since in Australia the term "Left Wing" is often used both affectionately and pejoratively as a synonym for "Communist", perhaps the writer should explain that here it is used to mean the extreme Left wing of the Labour Party, including also an assorted collection of New Statesmen and women who owe definite allegiance to no party but are vaguely grouped as "progressives."

Drafting A Constitution For A European Community

By W. A. Townsley

IN the European summer of 1951 the Convention of the European Community of Coal and Steel was signed in Paris and awaited the ratification of the national parliaments of the six states within the Community. At the same time a search was being made for a formula, acceptable to both France and Germany, which would facilitate the signing by "the Six" of a Convention for a European Defence Community. What impelled all "good Europeans," like Schuman, Adenauer and de Gaspari, to accelerate was the mounting peril in the East. They had the goodwill and support of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. For, on 14th September, 1951, at Washington, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and Great Britain announced their agreement with the formation of a European Continental Community. Having refused to commit themselves to a Federal Europe or even to a functional organisation such as the E.C.S.C., the British Government made it clear that it wanted to establish the closest ties with the projected Continental Community at every stage of its development. The six Governments were therefore encouraged to go ahead, to clarify their aims, and to draft a constitution.

To begin with some body had to be invested with power and competence to do this job. When the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, representing fifteen member states, met at Strasbourg in December, 1951, it advised its Committee of Ministers to encourage the signing of an agreement by those States that were so inclined, setting up a Political Authority, subject to the Democratic control of a Parliamentary Assembly and having a competence restricted to the fields of defence and external affairs.¹ The exercise of sovereignty in common in these fields was regarded as necessary if a European Army was to be organised and to be employed within the orbit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In short, the Council of Europe was willing from the start to encourage the formation of a restricted community of perhaps six of the fifteen member states, and to see it vested with limited but real powers. Immediately following the signing of the European Defence Community Treaty in May, 1952, the Consultative Assembly of Strasbourg took up the problem again.² In article 38 of the E.D.C. Treaty the essential features of

1. Council of Europe: 3rd Ordinary Session, Doc. 108 — Report on the Aims and Prospects of European Policy.

2. Preparatory report on a European Political Authority submitted by M. Margue to the General Affairs Committee on 24th May, 1952.

March, 1954

the future federal or confederal structure were outlined. The Consultative Assembly made an advance on this. In its Resolution 14 of 30th May, 1952, it proposed "that the clauses in the E.D.C. Treaty which relate to the determination of the future political structure of Europe should be incorporated in a special agreement, distinct from the Treaty itself, and capable of being put into effect immediately." It desired that the E.C.S.C. when it met, or the Consultative Assembly, with a restricted membership, should be commissioned to draft a statute of a supranational political community, "which would remain open to all the member states of the Council of Europe and would include provisions for the association of those states which had not yet adhered to it." By their Luxembourg resolution on 10th September, 1952, the six Governments—Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg — approved these proposals and requested the Coal and Steel Assembly to prepare the draft within six months.

This Ad Hoc Assembly began by setting up a Constitutional Committee. It consisted of twenty-six members, most of them distinguished jurists, under the chairmanship of Heinrich von Brentano of the German Federal Republic. The committee included five Frenchmen, plus one representative of the Saar, six Germans, six Italians, three Belgians, three Netherlands and two Luxembourgers. Thirteen, or exactly half, represented parties with a Christian (Catholic) appellation. All the major French parties were represented except the Communists. The German Democratic Party boycotted the whole affair, as did the Opposition Left in Italy. The Committee set to work through four sub-committees dealing respectively with powers and competence, political institutions, judicial institutions and liaison problems. Observers were present from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Greece and Turkey, and they included the Secretary of the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.

The task of constitution making was immense. All members of the Committee were undoubtedly aware of the traditional prejudices and the particularist interests of each nation state that had to be either comprehended or overcome. But apart from these lasting and more fundamental problems they were expected to work hurriedly and in a matter of weeks to prepare reports and to draft a constitution. And all this had to be done against the background of disturbed domestic politics in the three major states, a change over in United States Executive Administration, and a constantly threatening international situation. That they achieved the results they did is a tribute to their pertinacity, their tolerance and their faith.

They were not given a blank cheque. A complex series of agreements previously entered into laid down the boundaries within which they could

construct. In recent years several treaties—in particular the Convention of Human Rights, the European Convention for Economic Co-operation, the Statute of the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty—have recognised that human rights, economic and social integration, defence and foreign policy are matters of common interest for the peoples of Europe. For instance, the European Community of Coal and Steel (E.C.S.C.) aims to establish a common market in one of the key sections of the economy. Accordingly the Committee enquiring into the powers and competence of the projected Political Authority, while envisaging its extension into other fields, restricted itself to those already accepted in the basic texts. For it recognised that national states, like men, “possess fundamental and inalienable rights which must never be encroached upon by the general competence of a federal or a confederal Community.”

The first problem was how to transfer the powers and competence of the E.C.S.C. and the E.D.C. to the European Political Community. The committee was unanimous in considering that it would be unthinkable that these two “restricted communities,” which had been constituted by separate treaties, “should exercise their powers side by side with, and independently of, a sovereign supranational Political Community having a general mission.”³ It was therefore resolved, while pointing out that it entailed no further surrender of sovereignty by national states, that the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions of the European Political Community should assume the functions of corresponding institutions of the E.C.S.C. and the E.D.C. However, some members thought that time should be allowed for the adaptation of the High Authority of the one and the Defence Secretariat of the other. While awaiting “the progressive establishment of the definitive regime,” the Presidents of the two “restricted communities” or “specialised authorities” should sit by night and exercise a vote in the European Executive Council, which at the same time should not be allowed to interfere in the activities of the High Authority and the Secretariat. Other members, on the contrary, argued that, to ensure Democratic responsibility and unified direction of policy, the two institutions should come directly under the European Parliament and Executive Council as soon as these were established. The two Presidents should sit on the Executive Council and be equally subject with the rest to Parliamentary censure, though the resignation of either President should not necessarily involve the rest of his colleagues on the governing body of the “specialised authority.” Such constitutional arrangements, argued these members, would facilitate ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty. A compromise was eventually reached whereby, until the expiry of the period of adaptation, the Presidents of the “specialised authorities” shall be allowed

3. Report of the Constitutional Committee (Paris, 20th Dec., 1952): Part 1, para. 6.

March, 1954

to sit *ex-officio* on the European Executive Council with a right to vote and without being subject to parliamentary censure, while at the same time discharging their duties "under the direction and supervision of the European Executive Council." After that period the Council will be able to take over the functions of both authorities. In this way it was thought to satisfy those who were anxious not to jeopardise the work already begun by the "technocrats" of the "specialised authorities" and those who were determined to enforce at the earliest full democratic control.⁴

At this point the question arose how far the E.C.S.C. and E.D.C. Treaties would have to be revised, if the projected Political Community was going to exercise authority over these institutions. For, by virtue of their founding statute and treaty, both institutions exercise normative powers.⁵ The Constitutional Committee, while favouring the continuance of the status quo during the period of adaptation, believed that the European Parliament, once it was established, should be "associated with the exercise of those normative powers of the Community, which are most important for the future development of European legislation." While recognising the possibility of a conflict with the provisions of the founding statute and treaty, it was held that the Community should not be deprived of the right to adapt these "to the necessities of European life." The main difficulty lay in that the constitutional provisions of these treaties were contractual by nature and therefore any modification of them would involve the approval of respective national parliaments. On the other hand, the normative provisions, unlike the constitutional provisions, were matter for the internal arrangement of the Community. Nevertheless the Committee proposed, for realistic reasons, that these provisions should not be amended without the approval of the Council of National Ministers.⁶

Now it is perhaps time to turn to the general principles that govern the institutions that it is proposed to establish to serve the European Community. It was laid down categorically that the Community must have a Democratic basis. To this end the Lower or People's House of the European Parliament should be elected directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot.⁷ At the same time it is recognised that the member States, anxious to retain their identity born of many historic associations, should be represented in the other chamber, called the Senate. According to this, the European Parliament will be bicameral. The People's Chamber will consist of 261 members; 63 for Germany, Italy and France with an

4. Report of the Constitutional Committee (Paris, 20th Dec., 1952): paras. 8 and 9.

5. Articles 95 E.C.S.C. Statute and 124 E.D.C. Treaty lay down that new rules can be made by the executive institutions of these Communities with the unanimous concurrence of the Council of Ministers, representing the States.

6. Report, Part I, paras. 11-21.

7. Art. 13 of Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community and adopted by Ad Hoc Assembly in Strasbourg on 10th March, 1953.

additional 7 to represent French overseas departments and territories; 30 for Belgium and the Netherlands and 12 for Luxembourg. The Senate will be one third of this size, while retaining the same ratio of representatives between the States as in the Lower House, excepting that France will have no special representation for overseas territories. Thus constituted the members of the Senate will be qualified to sit in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. The vexed question of the Saar was referred to the Special Council of Ministers of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Senate will be elected by the national parliaments and, like the People's House, will, subject to certain provisions, sit for five years.⁸

The question of a European Executive Council raised more difficulties. As much of the principle of separation of powers as is common to national institutions was taken as a starting point. It had then to be decided how the first President was to be appointed. Some preferred to leave it to the Council of National Ministers acting by a two-thirds majority. Alternative suggestions were that the President and his colleagues should be appointed by the People's Chamber on the recommendation of the Council of National Ministers and again that the decision should be made in a joint session of the two houses. In the end it was decided that the Senate should elect the President in secret ballot and by majority vote, and that it should be left to the President to choose his colleagues, providing that not more than two were of the same nationality.⁹

On the question of the relations between this Executive and Parliament the principle of collective and individual responsibility was upheld. At first it was thought expedient to put a limitation of two years on the Council's period of office. This was not insisted upon once rules were drafted which made the Council subject to censorship in one or other of the two houses. A vote of no confidence, or a withholding of confidence would force the Executive Council to resign. If, on the other hand, the People's Chamber passes a no-confidence vote with less than a three-fifths majority, the President will have the option, with the Senate's acquiescence, either to resign or to declare the People's Chamber dissolved.¹⁰

[Concluded in next issue]

8. Draft Treaty: Arts. 15, 16, 17.

9. *Ibid.* Art. 28.

10. *Ibid.* Art. 31.

March, 1954

Soviet Local Government And Democracy

T. H. Rigby, M.A.

THE study of the structure and functioning of local government institutions is one of the weaker points in our serious literature on the Soviet Union. As a result there has persisted a fairly widely-held belief that, however dictatorial and undemocratic the upper levels of Soviet government may be, there is, perhaps something in the Soviet claim to have achieved a vigorous and broad-based democracy at the grass-roots. This belief draws its strength from half-remembered myths which grew up on the basis of the superficial reports of unqualified observers in the first decade or so of Soviet power, and will not bear serious investigation. There is an obvious need for thorough study of the subject, and rich Soviet literary material is available which, if intelligently used, would be adequate for such a study. An article of this length can naturally only touch the edge of the subject and I shall concentrate on seeking to establish a few points about Soviet local government practice which are of especial relevance in an attempt to assess the nature and extent of democratic participation and control.

Firstly, how are the deputies to the local Soviets chosen? According to the constitutions of the U.S.S.R. (chapter XI) and the various Union Republics, they are elected "on the basis of universal equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot," with all citizens who have reached the age of 23 eligible for election and the right to nominate candidates vested in "public organisations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organisations, trade-unions, co-operatives, youth organisations and cultural societies." This right is extended by the election regulations¹ to public meetings of "collectives" of workers, peasants, soldiers etc. . . . at their places of work or service, and in practice the overwhelming majority of nominations are made at such meetings. All properly nominated persons who signify their willingness to stand for election must be registered as candidates and their names printed on the ballot paper together with the names of the organisations or work-place "collectives" nominating them and a note as to whether or not they are party members. Elections are held on a single non-working day, and cubicles are provided where the elector crosses off the ballot paper all names except that of the person he wishes to vote for. A candidate must receive an absolute majority

1. Polozhenie o vyborakh v kraevye, oblastnye, okruzhnye, raionnye, gorodskye, sel'skie i poselkovye sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya art.

of votes cast in his constituency to be elected, new elections being called where no candidate receives an absolute majority, or where less than half the eligible electors vote.

Since the adoption of the 1936 Constitution there have been four general elections of all local Soviets—in 1939, 1947, 1950 and February 1953. From the enormous amount of material appearing in the Soviet Press, and especially the provincial Press, in the course of these campaigns, important facts may be inferred about the selection of deputies.¹

In the first place, as is well known to be the case also in election to the Supreme Soviet, in no constituency is more than one person ever registered as candidate. However, it is claimed that there is the fullest public discussion and participation in the process whereby this candidate is chosen. After all nominations are in, a "pre-election consultation" is held in each constituency, consisting of representatives of bodies entitled to nominate candidates, for the purpose of discussing the nominations and "negotiating on common candidates." Let us look into this claim.

Serious doubt as to the spontaneity of the pre-election process must arise even from a reading of the reports of nomination meetings. The principle of unanimity has been strictly preserved at every one of the thousands of such meetings reported at length; no criticism of the nominated candidates was offered, nor was there even a hint of the possibility of alternative candidates. If this does not convince us that the candidates are fixed on behind the scenes before the "nomination" meetings are called, there are other facts to consider. For example, as a town is divided up into constituencies with the population of only 350-1000, each sending one deputy to the town soviet, any even moderately-sized "collective" will normally contain people from a number of constituencies, and in fact at the nomination meetings of large "collectives" candidates are often put forward for several constituencies. However, different candidates for the same constituency are never put forward by different collectives. This being so, it is not surprising that, when all nominations are in, it invariably "happens" that each constituency has one effective candidate and never more than one.² There is thus no "negotiation" for the pre-election

1. The following generalisations are based on a study of the following Soviet newspapers for the periods mentioned: "Pravda," "Izvestia," "Moskovskii Bolshhevik," "Leningradskaya Pravda," "Sovetskaya Latvya" (Riga), "Sovetskaya Litva" (Vilnus), "Pravda Vostoka" (Tashkent), "Sovetskaya Belorussia" (Minsk), "Bakinskii Rabochiv" (Baku), "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" (Alma-Ata), "Pravda Ukrainy" (Kiev), "Sovetskaya Moldavia" (Kishnev) and "Zarya Vostoka" (Tbilisi), except for the period of the 1939 election campaign, for which only "Pravda" and "Izvestia" were available.

2. I say "effective" candidate because in many constituencies, besides the person who is eventually registered as the candidate, one or more of the central leaders is nominated. The pre-election consultations in such constituencies do not attempt to resolve this pseudo-plurality of nominations, it being automatically liquidated when each of the central leaders announces in which constituency he agrees to stand — in every case the only constituency where he is the sole nominee. This whole procedure is identical with that followed in elections to the Supreme Soviet — see my article "Changing Composition of the Supreme Soviet," "Political Quarterly," June-August, 1953. Several central leaders are formally elected as deputies to a large number of city and regional soviets throughout the country.

March, 1954

consultations to do, so that, to use the official formula, they merely "turn into a mighty demonstration of the unity of the party and the people."

It is obvious that such a remarkable combination of "coincidences" is inconsistent with the existence of the slightest degree of spontaneity in the pre-selection process. Nevertheless great efforts are made to vest nomination meetings with the maximum appearance of spontaneity, and whereas in party elections many hints may be obtained from Press reports as to the processes behind the scenes whereby candidates are decided upon, such hints are rigorously avoided in the case of elections to the Soviets. By whatever methods the membership of the local soviets is in fact determined,¹ it is clear that the wide public participation and discussion ostensibly aimed at by the provisions of the constitution and electoral law are completely absent.

Apart from the 76,000 village and settlement soviets, soviets were elected in February this year for the following units: 6 territories, 144 regions, 9 autonomous regions, 10 national areas, 26 administrative areas, 4,418 districts, 1,498 towns, and 511 wards in large towns,² varying in size from the minimum of 9 for a small village soviet to the prodigious 1,500 of the Moscow City Soviet. How are these Soviets composed?

First, as to party membership. The proportion of party membership of deputies to all local soviets varies considerably from republic to republic—from a little under a third to slightly over a half.³ Although figures for 1953 are incomplete, there has been in previous years a tendency for the proportion of party members to increase. Thus between 1947 and 1950 the percentage of party membership of all deputies to local soviets in the R.S.F.S.R. rose from 46.8 to 52.5, in the Ukraine from 31.8 to 34, in White Russia from 26.7 to 30.4 (35.6 in 1953), in Georgia from 40.1 to 49.4. However there are exceptions to this general trend, in many individual soviets and in the overall percentage of all soviets in some of the smaller republics, mostly to be interpreted as reductions from exceptionally high earlier levels. As one might expect, the higher the unit the larger the proportion of party members. The proportion of women deputies, incidentally, which now averages 30-40 per cent. and also shows a steady increase, varies in the opposite direction, as the following figures demonstrate.

1. On the analogy of Western political practise one might suspect that considerable back-room agitation and manoeuvring precedes the final choice of a candidate. However, since the role of a local soviet and its members is, as we shall see, quite different from that of any Western elective body, it is at least doubtful whether the motives for such practises exist.

2. Sovetskaya Moldavia, March 14th, 1953.

3. Lithuania is exceptional in this respect in that even now only 21.5 per cent. of the deputies to its local soviets are party members — compared with 35.9 per cent in Latvia and 33.9 per cent. in Estonia.

**Percentage of Party Members and Women in the Local Soviets
of Leningrad Region (1947)**

	Party-per cent.	Women-per cent.
Village soviets	36.4	39.6
Town soviets (except Leningrad)	61.6	36.5
District soviets	69.1	33.0
Leningrad Regional Soviet	80.0	23.3

As between different soviets of the same kind, the degree of uniformity in the proportion of party membership is remarkable. Compare these percentages in city soviets elected in 1950: Alma-Ata 57.7, Leningrad 59.2, Baku 60.1, Tashkent 64.1, Moscow (1953) 61.

From biographical material published during the election campaigns and from figures announced at post-election sessions of the soviet, much information may be obtained about the occupational status of the deputies. Below is printed an analysis of the membership of a number of local soviets where the occupation of all or almost all the deputies has been identified. In this table those normally classified by Soviet authorities as members of the "class stratum" of "intelligentsia": executives and university or college-trained specialists in industry and agriculture, party, state and other officials, and people working in the fields of scientific research, education, medicine and the arts — have been broken up into three categories, and workers and peasants employed up to the foreman level grouped together in a fourth.¹

Soviet	Officials	Science			Agriculture and Industry	
		Arts Education Medicine	Executives and Specialists	Workers and Peasants up to Foreman Level		
Pervomai ward, Frunze (1953)	28	33	11	19	(20.9%)	
Proletarsky ward, Frunze (1953)	22	14	29	54	(43.7%)	
Moscow City (1947)	430	208	204	525	(38.4%)	
Riga City (1950)	104	45	37	114	(37.6%)	
Kishinev City (1953)	90	31	38	71	(30.1%)	
Minsk region (1947)	55	7	11	10	(12%)	
Leningrad region (1950) . . .	73	49	38	44	(18.9%)	
Tashkent region (1947) . . .	95	17	31	48	(25.2%)	
Moscow region (1953)	144	41	48	80	(25.4%)	

1. Soviet sources are far from consistent in the use of their categories "working class," "peasantry" and "intelligentsia." Thus while in some contexts the intelligentsia is defined as "merely yesterday's workers and peasants promoted to leading posts," official analyses of the membership of soviets, after stating percentages of workers, peasants and intelligentsia, proceed to give figures for the "workers" and "peasants" who are "engaged in leading party, state, military, economic and other work."

March, 1954

Thus, in all but the village soviets party members are in a firm majority, and the rank and file workers and peasants combined have a substantially lower representation than the bureaucratic-managerial-professional "intelligentsia."

Before attempting to comment on the significance of these facts, perhaps we should give some consideration to the functioning of the soviets. The Union constitution charges them with wide responsibilities: "The Soviets of Working People's Deputies direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens, direct local economic and cultural affairs and draw up the local budget" (art. 97). Yet for the performance of these duties regional soviets are required to meet only four times a year, district soviets 6 times a year, and town soviets once a month.¹ In practice the intervals between sessions are commonly much wider,² and sessions rarely last more than one day.³ This obviously does not permit the soviets to exercise any constant control over local affairs, and the task of day-to-day leadership is in fact delegated to their executive committees.

Nevertheless Soviet writers insist that the most important questions in the life of the localities are decided by the soviets at their sessions. It is true that, as well as the adoption of the budget and the approval of the annual report of their Executive Committee, other important subjects are set for discussion by the soviets: results of the past school year and measures for improving the work of the schools, the improvement of the livestock industry, maintenance and beautification of streets and parks, the reports of the executive committees of lower soviets, current agricultural campaigns, etc. . . . However, it is clear from a reading of the verbatim reports of the sessions of local soviets published in the Soviet provincial Press that the discussion is completely lacking in spontaneity; indeed, while the practice of executive committees restricting speeches made at sessions to the precise texts they have approved beforehand has been officially condemned,⁴ great stress is laid on the importance of the prior "organisation" of sessions by executive committees.⁵ One should also note the way questions are put for discussion: it is never a question of choosing between alternative courses of action, but rather of assessing the effectiveness of local offices and officials in performing the tasks set them by the party and the state. Consequently, criticism is directed at men rather than measures.

1. Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., arts., 85-87. In most other republics the constitutional provisions are the same.

2. *Izvestia*, June 27th, 1952 and July 3rd, 1952. *Partiinaya Zhizn* No. 12, 1947, pp. 7-8.

3. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* No. 4, 1952, p. 47.

4. *Partiinaya Zhizn* No. 12, 1947, p. 8.

5. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* No. 4, 1952, p. 43.

The "organisation" of sessions is reflected in the unanimity of their proceedings. Although the question of priorities is obviously of great importance where local public authorities are responsible for the provision of a wide range of services run in other countries by private business, one would think from a study of these reports that human nature permitted no two points of view on the greater desirability of opening a new hairdresser's shop or providing a kiosk in the park of culture and rest. Finally, the principle of unanimity extends to the election of the executive committee. The soviets are clearly not organs where important decisions are made. Nor are they, as some Western writers suggest, arenas in which the public reaction to official policies is tested. Their role, nevertheless, is not a wholly insignificant one, as I shall attempt to show later. But first, how are we to assess the position of their executive committees?

Constitutionally local executive committees are subject to "dual subordination," being accountable both to the soviet which "elected" them and to the executive organs of the soviet next above them. As in practice the activities of the soviet as a whole are dependent on its executive committee rather than the reverse, the importance of the executive committee as an organ of collective decision might appear to depend solely on the breadth of discretion permitted it by the higher state organs.¹ It would require a longer article than this to attempt to assess the scope of decision which local authorities enjoy in practise, and I must confine myself merely to expressing the opinion that it is not negligible. However, we are now on our guard against using constitutional forms as a guide to reality, and even the fact that large numbers of concrete decisions are issued in the name of the executive committee may not convince us that these decisions are reached at its sittings. Perhaps the executive committee merely acts as a rubber-stamp for decisions made by its chairman, a small nucleus of its members, or some outside body. There is scattered evidence to the contrary. While minutes or detailed reports are not published, their sittings are certainly held frequently (though often with several members absent)² and even the meagre references available suggest that they are often the scene of genuine discussion which contributes to the character of the decisions enacted.

The functions of the executive committee of the soviet thus come closer than those of the soviet as a whole to being comparable with the functions of a local council in an English-speaking country. As, however, the election of the executive committee by its soviet is "organised,"

1. Article 80 of the R.S.F.S.R. constitution reads: Soviets of working people's deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the rights granted them by the laws of the U.S.S.R., the R.S.F.S.R. and the Autonomous Republic.

2. "Leningradskaya Pravda", March 31st, 1951.

March, 1954

and the choice of membership of the soviet itself is not even the subject of open public discussion, merely to show that the executive committee of the soviet rather than some extra-constitutional body is the organ of local government does not help to prove that local government in the Soviet Union is democratic. It only proves that amongst the various officers and bodies responsible for local government, none of which are subject to democratic election, one of them — a collegiate body — plays a leading and co-ordinating role.

If, on the other hand, it could be shown that the executive committees are so composed as to be fairly representative of the various elements in the local population, some might feel that the cause of democracy is served by their enjoying a central position amongst local government organs. There is no need to argue this point, as they are not so composed. Numbering from under ten to over twenty, the membership of local executive committees is made up overwhelmingly of local officials, with full-time paid officers of the executive committee itself usually forming a majority. The following analysis of the members of a number of regional and city executive committees,¹ with a total membership of 248, brings this out.

144 full-time paid officers of the executive committee	(58.1%) ²
22 chairmen or vice-chairmen of subordinate committees . .	(8.9%)
4 other state officials	(1.6%)
20 secretaries of the corresponding party committee	(8.1%)
10 other party officials	(4%)
4 officials of the Y.C.L. Trade Unions and other "Public organisations"	(1.6%)
3 senior military officers	(1.2%)
9 working in the fields of education, medicine, scientific research and the arts	(3.6%)
14 economic executives	(5.6%)
7 foremen and workers in industry and agriculture	(2.8%)
11 unidentified	(4.4%)

Any attempt to evaluate Soviet local government practise from the standpoint of democracy must remain superficial without an assessment of the role of the local organs of the Party. Under the Soviet constitution

1. Regional Executive Committees: Leningrad (1950), Moscow (1948), Tashkent (1948 and 1951), Alma-Ata (1948); City Executive Committees: Minsk (1948), Kishinev (1948), Alma-Ata (1950), Tbilisi (1948 and 1950), Leningrad (1950), Baku (1948 and 1951). The sole consideration determining the inclusion or non-inclusion of an executive committee in this analysis was the proportion of its members whose posts were definitely identified.

2. Composed of the following:—Chairmen—13; vice-chairmen—50; secretaries—13; chairmen of planning committees—9; heads of departments and administrations of the executive committee—57; vice-heads of departments—2. The departments most frequently represented are: education (11), finance (11), health (8), and agriculture (6).

(art. 126), the party is "the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both public and state." In order to perform their leading function in regard to the local organs of the state, regional, district and city party committees have large staffs of full-time officials, with departments and sectors for every important branch of local economic and cultural life. Soviet constitutional lawyers¹ speak of three main ways the party's leadership at the various levels of state activity manifests itself:

- (1). Party organisations "seek to advance" their members into the basic posts of state work;
- (2). They check the activity of the government organs, correcting their mistakes and "trying to ensure them the support of the masses";
- (3). They give the government organs guiding directions on all "general questions" of their activity.

Let us consider briefly what the first and third of these points means when applied at the local levels.

The key post in any local government unit is that of the chairman of the executive committee of the soviet, and the general principle is that appointments² to this post are made by the next higher party committee. Thus the chairman of a regional executive committee is chosen by the Republican Central Committee of the Party (or the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in regions or territories of the R.S.F.S.R., which has no Republican Central Committee), the chairman of a district executive committee by the regional (or territorial) party committee, and the chairman of a village soviet by the district party committee; towns and cities may come directly under republican, regional (or territorial) or district supervision, and the chairmen of their executive committees are chosen by the party committee of the unit to which they are subordinate.³ Appointments to the other leading posts in the executive committee, on the other hand, including the vice-chairmen and most of the departmental heads,

1. e.g., Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Law Institute, "Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo," Moscow, 1948, p.p. 285-6; A. Gorkin, "The Party of Bolsheviks — the Guiding Force of the Soviet State," in *Sovetskoe Sotsialisticheskoe Gosudarstvo*, Moscow, 1948, pp. 8-10.

2. Soviet writers of course avoid the term "appointment" in referring to formally elective posts, replacing it by such words as "nomination," "promotion" or "recommendation." But as unanimous approval is always forthcoming for the official candidate in the case of chairmen of executive committees (unlike some other posts, such as that of chairman of a collective farm, where opposition to the official nominee occasionally emerges), "appointment" would appear best to convey the state of affairs.

3. No Soviet source that I know explicitly states this, and the generalisation is based on the fact that this distribution of responsibility for such appointments is invariably implied in references in the Soviet Press to particular appointments, e.g., "Partiinoye Stroitel'stvo," No. 3-4, 1945, p. 22, "Partiinaya Zhizn'" No. 3, 1947 p. 66; No. 5, 1947, p. 31; No. 12, 1947, p. 17; and No. 4, 1948, p.p. 70-71; "Sovetskaya Belorussia," 31st March, 1948 and 19th February, 1948; "Pravda Ukrainy," 4th June, 1948; "Pravda," 13th May, 1952, 20th June, 1952, 15th August 1952, 22nd September, 1952, 26th September, 1952 and 10th December, 1952.

March, 1954

are made by the **corresponding** party committee, and only the most junior appointments are in the hands of the executive committee itself or its departments.¹

No such precise generalisations may be made about the party's role as a giver of "guiding directions" as there is no uniformity in local practise in this field. The fact that party officials are made responsible for the state of local affairs, especially in the field of production, subjects them to the constant temptation to pass beyond the making of policy decisions to prescribing the precise administrative measures for the execution of these decisions. This problem of party committees assuming the functions of local executive committees and public offices arose in the first months of Soviet power and has been endemic ever since. In practise, at times of crisis the central leadership has submitted to the logic of the situation and not opposed this tendency. "It is fresh in everyone's memory," said Popkov, secretary of the Leningrad city and regional party committees, in 1946, "how both the city and the district committees of the party became in the period of the blockade operative staffs, deciding hundreds of economic questions, down to the transfer of equipment from factory to factory, the selection of the labour force, the supply of raw materials, instruments, fuel, etcetera. . . This was demanded by the circumstances and it was correct."² At other times it has condemned it, with varying degrees of conviction. The inevitable ineffectuality of such condemnation given the responsibility of party officials for the work of their state opposite numbers, their possession of large specialised staffs and the right to intervene at any point to apply directives which have "the force of law"³ is borne out by the fact that despite the energetic campaign conducted since 1946 against party committees performing the functions of the local state organs, in practically every report of the local party conferences which preceded the Nineteenth Party Congress last year the party committees were accused of precisely this sin.

Such accusations, incidentally, are valuable sources of information as to the precise fields of state activity which party organs take upon themselves. We find the Lvov regional party committee being criticised because its schools department is "fulfilling the functions" of the education department of the regional executive committee.⁴ The agriculture department of the Riazan regional party committee does the regional agriculture administration's work for it, "spending much time on the collection of all sorts of returns and drawing up states, and pays little

1. See e.g. "Partiinaya Zhizn'," No. 8, 1946, p. 34; No. 2, 1947, p. 53; No. 12, 1947, p. 69; No. 5, 1948, p. 23; "Pravda" 3rd, 8th and 21st April, 1952, 16th June, 1952, 1st July, 1952 and 12th August, 1952.

2. "Partinoe Stroitel'stvo," 9-10, 1946; p. 19.

3. "Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo," p. 286.

4. "Pravda," 17th September, 1952.

attention to basic questions of the development of agriculture."¹ Khabarovsk city party committee itself undertakes the provision of building sites with bricks, rails, metal and other materials.² Of 283 questions considered by the bureau of a Ukrainian regional party committee in the four-months period October 1947—January 1948, only 29 were concerned with party work.³ The Astrakhan regional party committee takes upon itself the decision of all questions related to the fishing industry. "If the head of the Volga-Caspian Fisheries Trust has trouble over materials, transport, or the building of fishing boats, it is always to the regional party committee that he applies, never to the regional executive committee."⁴ As frequently happens, these "incorrect methods" of the regional committee are passed on to the lower levels of leadership. In one district of the region, for instance "the secretary of the district party committee crosses off the agenda of the district executive committee all questions relating to the fishing industry, and has turned the fisheries department of the executive committee into a working apparatus for the preparation of material for the current sitting of the district party committee."⁵ In rural areas we find district party committees distributing coal to collective farm workshops and fodder to stock-raising farms,⁶ issuing instructions to village soviets on the procurement of wood, the repair of club-houses, and the cleaning of seed,⁷ switching tractors from farm to farm, distributing fuel and spare parts to machine and tractor stations and instructing them on what field work to do and when.⁸

A thorough study of such practises, and of related ones — the issuing by party committees and the corresponding executive committees of joint decisions on economic matters, the sending of directives by departments of regional executive committees through the town and district party committees instead of directly to their town and district offices, etc . . . — along with an effort to assess how typical they are, is essential before any comprehensive definition of the role of party organs in local government can be attempted. For our present purpose it is enough to know that reports of these practises are sufficiently widespread, frequent and continuous to indicate a strong tendency for party organs to interpret very widely their responsibility of giving "guiding directions" and to concentrate much of the detailed work of administration within their own apparatus.

1. "Pravda," 22nd September, 1952.

2. "Pravda," 10th September, 1952.

3. "Partiinaya Zhizn'," No. 5, 1948, P. 14.

4. "Partiinaya Zhizn'," No. 4, 1948, p. 40.

5. "Ibid," p. 43.

6. "Pravda," 13th August, 1952.

7. "Partiinaya Zhizn'," No. 5, 1948, p. 22.

8. "Sovetskaya Belorussia," 31st March, 1948; "Pravda," 15th May, 1952.

March, 1954

To the extent that the party's leading role at the local level is exercised by any collegiate organ, this is not the local party committee itself, a body of several dozen members meeting briefly every few weeks and which is no more a decision-making organ than is the local soviet; rather it is the bureau of the party committee, a body of 7-11 members, of which the chairman of the executive committee is always a member but occupying a position therein subordinate to that of the first party secretary.

The picture of the formulation and execution of local policy that emerges from the preceding discussion bears little relation to that implied by the provisions of the Union and Republican constitutions. It is not a favourable picture from the point of view of democratic participation and control. The executive committee "of the soviet" indeed plays an important, if secondary role, but its membership and activity are controlled within the limits set by the higher organs of party and state — not by its soviet, but by the local party leadership. As for the Soviet itself, not only is it excluded both from a share in policy-making and from acting as a check on those who do make and execute policy decisions, but it is not even democratically chosen. However, some remnant can be salvaged from the exorbitant claims made by Soviet spokesmen for the democracy of their local government system if attention is directed towards certain other aspects of the soviets' role.

The soviets are not merely vice's homage to virtue, although their importance as a democratic cloak to "bureaucratic" or "managerial" practice should not be underrated. Nor should the transparency of the cloak to the politically sophisticated outside observer be taken as a measure of its efficacy: "truth" and "belief" in their relation to social action and attachments are not to be confused with the "truth" and "belief" which move on the plane of uncommitted curiosity. There are other psychological functions of the soviets which might be mentioned. It is clear from the manner in which the personalities and biographies of the deputies is presented to the people that the latter are encouraged to identify themselves, through their deputies, with the regime and the community at large. In my opinion such non-material functions of the soviets would alone justify to the Soviet leaders — even if the importance of the democratic facade to the cause of the U.S.S.R. abroad is ignored — the considerable expense and effort entailed in organising their elections and sessions. At the same time they produce some more immediately practical and tangible benefits.

The first series of such benefits derives from the obligation of the deputy to maintain close contact with his constituents. On the one hand he must make himself regularly available for interview, to advise his

electors on problems arising from their relations with local public offices, telling them where to address complaints, applications and inquiries and acting on their behalf where necessary. On the other hand he has to report back frequently to his constituency, not only on his own work, but on the work of the soviet as a whole; while the sessions of the soviet are used to dramatise the statistical evidence on the state of work in various fields and to direct attention to areas of weakness, the deputies serve as so many mouthpieces communicating the "lessons" of the sessions to the general population.

The sessions have other uses. The channelling of popular dissatisfaction and resentment away from the party leadership against junior officialdom is an important element in the communist technique of ruling, and the sessions of the soviets along with party conferences, plenary meetings of party committees, and the Press, is one of the chief arenas for the voicing of attacks on the red-tape, sloth, inefficiency, rudeness or corruption of local "bureaucrats." Such attacks, while "organised" in the sense of being directed against persons and organs and expressed in terms considered expedient by the local party leadership, are spontaneous in the sense of answering a strongly felt need. The pillorying of bureaucracy not only provides scapegoats, but is a valuable end in itself; since bureaucratic inefficiency and abuses represent a perennial problem of Soviet government, no weapon that can safely be deployed against them is neglected. So in the preparation of sessions of the soviets, the deputies are employed to check up on the organisations and enterprises whose work is to be "discussed."

A similar function is performed by the "permanent commissions" of the soviets, which are formed from the deputies (with the recruitment of outside "activists") for each of the various areas of economic and cultural activity under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Scarcely an organisation or enterprise is free from the investigations of teams from one or the other of these standing commissions, some of which, moreover, do not limit themselves to rooting out inefficient and dishonest practices, but go on to organise public participation in such work as the building and repair of fences, the painting of buildings and the planting and tending of decorative trees and shrubs.

In these various ways the soviets may constitute a useful arm of the local leadership. Of course performance frequently falls short of the ideal. Deputies not supervised by their executive committee tend to be lax about reporting to their constituents; a deputy acting on behalf of a constituent may be ignored or fobbed off by the official to whom he applies, and unless the ear of some more authoritative person can be gained, the matter will probably rest there; permanent commissions some-

March, 1954

times exist only on paper; some executive committees make no use of the services of the deputies in preparing material for sessions of the soviets. At least in the case of many town soviets, however, the soviets certainly function largely as intended, and taken as a whole they make a considerable if minor and inessential contribution to the smooth functioning of the system.

It is in the light of the multiform role of the soviets that the facts about their membership should be interpreted. This role requires that the soviets should contain:

- (a) A fair cross-section of the local community — to facilitate what I have called their "psychological" functions;
- (b) Sufficient specialists in various fields to give competent leadership to the permanent commissions;
- (c) A wide range of local officials, not only to lend authority to their sessions and commissions and to invest the officials with the aura of "people's representatives," but to make them available for exercise in "self-criticism" at sessions of the soviets when required. The membership of the soviets analysed above is seen to meet these criteria.

The machinery of Soviet local government does not provide for public participation in the formulation of policy, but it does give opportunities for those who wish to play a minor part in helping to achieve the success of measures decided upon by the party and state officialdom. It may not permit "every cook" to govern the state, but it gives her a chance of serving as an honorary part-time junior Public servant. This will appear a less impressive achievement to us than it may to a nation accustomed for generations to a bureaucracy closed to and set over against the people.

Australia At War — The Political Story

Review Article

T. Inglis Moore

UNDER the inspiration of Dr. Bean as Editor and part author, the official history of Australia in World War 1 itself made history as a fresh and original form of historical treatment. It reinforced the orthodox narrative of military campaigns with a new technique of social perspective and personal detail. It thus humanised war history and gave it a peculiar warmth and intimacy. There was a shift of emphasis from the strategy of campaigns and the tactics of battles to the men who fought them, generals and diggers alike. This treatment was handled so brilliantly that Dr. Bean and the official history won a very high international reputation.

Mr. Gavin Long, as General Editor of the official history of Australia in the war of 1939-1945, has continued this tradition of enterprise by planning a "civil" series of five volumes to be included in the twenty-two volumes of the new history, two of them to be devoted to the political and social history of wartime Australia. The first of them, "The Government and the People 1939-1941," by Paul Hasluck, has now appeared. This monumental book of over 600 pages is essentially a political history of the period from the commencement of war to the entry of Japan, but is not restricted to governmental changes and policies during this time. Two introductory chapters deal with defence policy, rearmament, and other war preparations between the two world wars, as well as outlining the political scene. Two other chapters are "digressions" on manpower and resources and on wartime administration. The wide coverage is completed by a general retrospect and a series of appendixes dealing with such wartime diversions as the banning of the Communist Party, industrial disputes, the case of Ratcliff and Thomas, recruiting for the A.I.F., the Winkler case, and the withdrawal from Tobruk.

Mr. Hasluck has enjoyed many advantages as author. In the first place, he was given unrestricted access to "official records from the War Cabinet papers and 'top secret' cablegrams down to the routine departmental files." His main sources appear to have been the War Cabinet papers, Advisory War Council records, Hansard, and departmental files, supplemented, of course, by Press reports, personal discussions with participants in the political scene, government advisors, and public servants, and other forms

March, 1954

of reference. Secondly, he had the advantage of his considerable personal qualifications, which include his published work as an historian, his training as Research Reader in History in the University of Western Australia, his work as a professional journalist, and his experience as a senior officer of the Department of External Affairs, not only at home but abroad, where he made his mark in international gatherings as a diplomat of outstanding ability. It is perhaps not so widely known that he is also a poet of talent: I remember reviewing his book of verse "Into the Desert" in the thirties, and enjoying its vivid description and vigour of conviction. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that "The Government and the People" emerges as a fine piece of work, impressive for its solid body of detailed fact, its mature organization of a vast mass of material into a well-knit whole, its penetrating analysis that shows a first-class mind at work, and its excellent writing in a style distinguished by judicious phrasing, an occasional tart pungency, and much brilliance.

Limitations Of Treatment

To offset the advantages mentioned, Mr. Hasluck has had to contend with difficulties. Some of these are minor, but they provide limitations to his book. For example, it was considered that it should have to "serve for a time as a source book as well as a history," since there was an obligation on the part of a historian who had been given special access to historical material that would not be open to other writers for some years "to give as fully as possible and in the form of quotation extracts from statements or communications." Mr. Hasluck admits, rather sadly, that "Therefore the liveliness of the narrative was often sacrificed to completeness, and, in some instances too, proportion has suffered." The admission is correct. It seems that it was unduly hard on both the reader and Mr. Hasluck himself to sacrifice them both to the future historian. Would it not have been better for him to have told his story as a pure narrative, cleanly and in good shape, unencumbered by source extracts, and to have placed these in an appendix?

Again, whilst the use of War Cabinet, Advisory War Council, and other official papers has given Mr. Hasluck the special opportunity to document his story in a way no other historian could do, and so obtain a fuller accuracy, it carries also its own disadvantages. It tends, inevitably, to give a "formal" character sometimes to the story. Official documents, after all, only tell half the story. They usually leave out all the personal emotions and relations, the private motivations and the nuances of attitudes, which lie behind the formal facade. Furthermore, whilst it is important to have the record straight and complete on official policies, it is even more important to know, not only their causes or motives but also their results

in action. Frequently we have a long statement of policy in such matters as defence programmes followed by a few lines in which Mr. Hasluck records briefly that little or nothing was done to carry out the programmes. On the face of it and at first blush the War Book looks an impressive achievement, but in wartime much of it remained a dead letter. Mr. Hasluck is not insensible, it is true, to these pitfalls in the path of the official historian following the official records. He is too old a campaigner to be taken in by the verbal camouflages of officialdom. His own stance is realistic throughout. But the disparity between the page of policy statement and the two lines recording that the policy was not implemented in action cannot but leave some impression of formalism. The labour of the mountain has produced only a little mouse, but sometimes you almost miss the mouse beside the sheer bulk of the mountain.

Dependence on official records tends, moreover, to place the stress on Government policies and programmes. These are described with a fullness that will make this volume the standard reference in its field. On the other hand, the result is that the book deals far more with the Government than with the people. True, there are discerning discussions of popular attitudes and some critical comments on various phases of public opinion. Yet one would welcome at times a fuller treatment of what was thought by the ordinary citizen. Although this volume is described as "the political and social" one of the war history, Mr. Hasluck states frankly that "the social aspect" has been made subsidiary to the "political", and it is clear, I think, that a proper handling of the social currents and war effects would have demanded another two years of research in a difficult field of intangibles and a separate volume. On the purely "political" side, however, it was the attitude of the common people which helped to shape Government policies and which, in the end, determined the actual composition of the Government through its election vote. It is possible that some more even balance might have been struck between the story of the Government and the story of the people, that the course of the ship of war might have been seen a little more from the deck and the fo'castle at the expense of seeing it so completely from the bridge, even if Mr. Hasluck had necessarily, by the nature of his assignment, to see through the eyes of the Captain rather than the crew.

Controversial Issues

The most formidable difficulty facing Mr. Hasluck was that as historian he had to pass judgment on political issues still fresh in the mind, on the policies of parties still contending for power, and — the touchiest point of all — on politicians who were leading participants in the war effort but who are still milling around in the present political arena. His

March, 1954

theme bristled with controversial issues, and one must sympathise with the unenviable task of the historian who had to discover some historical perspective on events and figures so close in time and attain on controversial issues that "reasonable degree of impartiality" which the Commonwealth History Committee has demanded for the volumes of the official war history.

Absolute impartiality on political matters and politicians known at first hand is probably impossible. As Benedette Croce once pointed out, every historian has to select his facts and use his personal judgment to interpret them, so that complete impartiality could only be achieved by eunuchs, and "history is not the business of eunuchs."

There is certainly nothing eunuch-like about Mr. Hasluck. He has strong political convictions of his own, and these have inevitably coloured his account, just as the book would have taken another complexion if it had been written by another historian of differing outlook, such as Dr. Evatt. Mr. Hasluck has not burked his judgments, but made them frankly and clearly, even if, on many occasions, the blows delivered are glancing ones, conveyed by implication very neatly and quite unmistakably. His interpretations are his own, and they will often find critics. On the whole, however, it seems to me that he has maintained, except perhaps in one or two cases which are debatable, a "reasonable degree of impartiality." There is no doubt that he has endeavoured quite scrupulously to be fair and accurate. As far as practicable, he documents his interpretations and lets the actual record speak for itself. It must be remembered, too, that this volume has been endorsed by Mr. Gavin Long as General Editor responsible for impartiality, and his integrity is unquestionable.

The controversial character of the book has aroused bitter controversy, of course, and it is worth noting some points that emerge from a survey of the statements and reviews devoted to the volume. Naturally attention has been directed to the fact that Mr. Hasluck is now himself not only a politician but Minister for Territories in a Menzies Government. Senator Ashley attacked Mr. Hasluck's dual role as historian and Liberal Minister, and Mr. Calwell condemned the volume roundly as "just so much Liberal Party propaganda." The "Century" found it only a "vigorous attempt" by the author "to whitewash his present political boss," but curiously termed Mr. Hasluck the "Minister for External Affairs" — an elementary error also perpetrated in another Sydney newspaper. A "Sydney Morning Herald" commentator denounced the book for its high estimate of Mr. Menzies, and considered that on occasions when Mr. Hasluck "takes sides in controversial wartime issues," then "its interpretations of events go bewilderingly astray."

On the other hand, the Press in other capitals than Sydney generally reviewed the book very favourably, praising its soundness and fairness. When there was criticism it was often ill-informed and superficial. It was sometimes not understood that Mr. Hasluck had completed the writing of his book, except for final revision, before he entered politics. He had also done practically all the research and some of the writing needed to complete his work by the second volume of "The Government and the People," which will cover the political history of the period 1942 to 1945. Since he was precluded by his office from taking any emolument from the Government, Mr. Hasluck offered to complete his work for the war history without fee, and this offer was accepted by the History Committee, which included Mr. Chifley, just as the Committee originally approved the selection of Mr. Hasluck as an official historian in 1943 when it was headed by Mr. Curtin, then Prime Minister. These facts remove the misunderstanding which prompted some of the comment directed against "The Government and the People" by Senator Ashley and Mr. Calwell.

It was natural that some of the criticism of the book was partisan, and that the Press in general showed interest, not in the book as a war history, but in the more controversial topics which came within its orbit. On a higher plane was the sound survey written by H. L. Harris in "The Australian Quarterly" and the first-class critique by L. F. Fitzhardinge in "Historical Studies." His points are very well taken in an acute analysis which makes the Press comments look shallow. It is worth noting the verdict of Mr. Fitzhardinge, Reader in Australian History at the Australian National University, as an expert in Mr. Hasluck's field: "There are no doubt some mistakes of fact and judgment here and there, but so far as I could check it, and in the general impression, the book is substantially fair and accurate, and stands as a very impressive achievement."

Mr. Menzies As Tragic Protagonist

Mr. Menzies is the core of controversies on "The Government and the People," since he was the leading political figure of the early wartime period, and the book is largely the story of his rise and fall, thus securing a certain dramatic unity. Indeed, it might even be subtitled "The Tragedy of Mr. Menzies." In many respects he is the "hero," since Mr. Hasluck presents him in such a light. There are, however, no complete "villains" in the cast, even if the part played by the dissidents in the United Australia Party is seen as a villainous one. Mr. Hasluck goes beyond his usual restraint when he writes: "It would reveal a much less repulsive condition of Australian politics if one could believe that the members of the U.A.P. who opposed Menzies and worked for his deposi-

March, 1954

tion in July and August 1941 were doing so simply because of their illusion that political stability and a united war effort might thereby be gained. It is difficult, either from the records or by tapping the memories of the participants, to reach with certainty an understanding of men's motives in this situation but they certainly were not as simple as that."

Mr. Hasluck, as historian, refrains from the simple expedient of writing melodrama, with a bare conflict of "goodies" and "baddies." Honestly and patiently he analyses the various factors at work in a complex situation — and this piece of analysis is one of the best pieces of writing and political insight shown in the book. It makes interesting reading. Mr. Menzies becomes, not a simplified hero, but the protagonist in a tragedy against a combination of forces which worked together to produce his resignation. These forces included the disintegration within the U.A.P. that had set in well before the death of Mr. Lyons and the coming to power of Mr. Menzies; the difficulties of coalition with or united support from the Country Party, itself torn by disagreements; the precarious position of the Government in Parliament after the indecisive elections of 1940, with its impracticable dependence on the two Independents; the uncertainty of the people which had produced this unsatisfactory position in the House; the constant, and sometimes captious, criticism of the Government and especially of Mr. Menzies by sections of the press; the ambitions for office of certain elements in the Labour Opposition, notably Dr. Evatt and Mr. Ward; the errors of both omission and commission on the part of the Menzies Government which sapped public confidence; and, finally the defects of the Prime Minister himself as a war leader. It is significant that on the whole the historian does not feel that one of the main forces against Mr. Menzies was the Leader of the Opposition — unless it were assumed that Mr. Curtin should have prevented the U.A.P. debacle by joining in a National Government, an assumption not made by Mr. Hasluck, who accepts the impracticability of a National Government as a fact which must be recognized rather than disputed.

There is small ground for cavilling at Mr. Hasluck's analysis of the forces combining against Mr. Menzies; his judgments seem sound except on one particular but that the crucial one—the capacities of Mr. Menzies as war leader. Here it is valuable to let the historian speak for himself by quotation in part of his brilliant character sketch of his "hero":

"In facing the peculiar difficulties of the office to which he had been called the new Prime Minister had the disadvantage of his own brilliance. A man of fine presence, ease of manner, pose, and style, he incurred the suspicion of being vain, of lacking sincerity, and of being aloof. A man of keen intellect he inevitably had often made lesser men seem foolish. A man who had consciously devoted himself to public service

in early manhood both in State and Federal politics, he incurred the accusation of being ambitious for office. He had been too obviously a potential Prime Minister for too long. A man whose democracy had been shaped by thinking rather than by physical contact with the crowd, and a man whose attainments and distinction marked him out in any company, he incurred the risk of being charged with losing touch with the common man and having no feeling for the daily problems of the worker . . . A shrewder or craftier man than Menzies would have learnt from Australian politics that ordinariness was sometimes an asset and he might have dissimulated. A less talented man might have learnt to depend more on others and to trust the people rather than to trust himself . . . He came to the Prime Ministership, however, at a time when his great gifts of advocacy, logical exposition, his lofty conception of liberal principles, his knowledge of law and the world, and his professional competence were to count less than the shrewdness, human understanding and skill in political management that keeps difficult people working together, the human ordinariness that does not invite enmity or expose itself to attack, the administrative training and experience which ensures that each decision leads to effective action, and the patient, detailed and even unimaginative industry that not only starts a machine but keeps it running and improvises, scraps and adjusts the parts as it goes along."

Later, in a section headed "The Downfall of Menzies," Mr. Hasluck makes the important point that, whatever the truth about him, politically, it was the public reputation that counted. "There was a feeling," he puts it, "that administrative action was becoming slow and indefinite, with words outstripping deeds. Second, it is clear that a number of people had reached a personal judgment that Menzies could not invigorate his team, however brilliant he might be as an individual. Such persons spoke of his aloofness, of his desire for pre-eminence, of his disposition to score off opponents; and some of them, too, alleged that he was too closely associated with big business interests in the city of Melbourne to win the trust of the common people or to ensure the full co-operation of equally powerful interests in Sydney. Their judgment was probably wrong, but the truth or falsity of the belief was of less importance than the fact that in such a situation such beliefs were spread. The fact that some seven or eight of his own party should have shown dissatisfaction with his leadership was, in a negative way, evidence of some shortcoming in that leadership. There is some indication in the records, too, that Menzies had returned from abroad with memories of how Churchill had handled his Cabinet. One or two of the things he said to his colleagues were perhaps a little more Churchillian than tactful. Australian politicians might admire the Churchill touch abroad but did not welcome it at home."

March, 1954

Later, in his "Retrospect," Mr. Hasluck comes again closely to grips with the problem of the Menzies fall when he says practically: "a large part of any criticism of the so-called failure of Menzies as a war leader should be criticism of him for failing to win the 1940 elections more decisively . . . In the case of Menzies, a more concrete test appears after the election. His so-called failure after that date was a failure in political management . . . Again, his concentration on the war effort meant neglect of the less lofty tasks of a Prime Minister and even some inability on his own part to tolerate the political conflict . . . His position was exceptionally difficult but he appeared to be unable to apply the humbler arts of political management to improve it."

On the criticism of Mr. Menzies as an administrator Mr. Hasluck makes some pertinent points. He considers that there were weaknesses: "Certainly towards the end of his period of office, there were signs in some branches of administration of failing drive and of delay between the making of a policy decision and the taking of effective action. The slowness in setting up the Department of War Organization of Industry and the Manpower Directorate is a case in point." His final conclusion on the matter, however, is favourable: "Considering first the weakness and inexperience of the administrative services when the war began and, second, the political difficulties of the whole period of his office, the administrative labours of Menzies command respect, even when they are criticised in points of detail."

The Hasluck Interpretation

Examining Mr. Hasluck's comments at various stages, one feels that he is striving hard to be accurate and well balanced, to get a fair perspective and to recognize the defects as well as the merits of Mr. Menzies. Yet the total impression given by the book is not that Mr. Menzies failed through his weaknesses but by a combination of ill fortune and enmities, and his downfall was, to some extent, undeserved. Mr. Hasluck's admiration for Mr. Menzies, along with his hostility to the enemies and critics, can be felt strongly. A closer scrutiny of the book suggests, indeed, that the historian is making out an apologia for Mr. Menzies, not because of any political bias, but simply because Mr. Menzies has engaged his warmest sympathies.

Hence his careful, often subtle, phrasing implies, even where it side-steps the explicit very deftly, that Mr. Menzies was blameless and the critics at fault. Those of us who were closely concerned with Federal politics then¹ will sometimes disagree with Mr. Hasluck's interpretation,

1. Editor's note: The writer was leader-writer on the staff of "The Sydney Morning Herald" from 1934 to 1940.

feel that more facts can be adduced which would modify some judgments, and regard a few of his statements as slightly ingenuous. For instance, when he states that Mr. Menzies "incurred the suspicion of being aloof," he implies that the "suspicion" was unwarranted. Surely it is a verifiable fact that the Menzies of 1940 was aloof — the mellowed Menzies of postwar years is a lobster of quite another colour — and this aloofness had an unfortunate effect on the rank and file of U.A.P. Parliamentary members, coming as it did in contrast to the friendly bonhomie of Mr. Lyons? Is there no connection between the affectionate loyalty Lyons inspired and the masterly way he held his rambunctious party together for seven years and, on the other hand, between the aloofness of his successor and the party disintegration? Again, Mr. Hasluck writes of Mr. Menzies that as "a man of keen intellect he inevitably had often made lesser men seem foolish?" Why "inevitably"? The non sequitur is plain. Was it not the fact rather that he had a fatal flair for sarcastic wit which he employed upon colleagues and followers, and thus "inevitably" created rancours which boomeranged against his leadership?

Mr. Hasluck refers to the "so-called failure of Menzies as war leader." Why the "so-called?" This seems close to special pleading. The historical record gives unquestionable evidence that Mr. Menzies failed as war leader of both his party and his country. Amongst the combination of factors that brought about his downfall as Prime Minister, in the end the primary factor was the personal one. Indeed, the tragedy presented by Mr. Hasluck conforms here, as in other respects, to the Aristotelean canon. There was the required fall from prosperity to adversity, the action had magnitude since its issue was the fate of a nation at war, the tragic character was one "some one of high fame and flourishing prosperity," and the person, as Aristotle demanded, was "not involved in misfortune by deliberate vice or villainy, but by some error of human frailty." It was this *hamartia*, or "great frailty" — indecision, ambition, and jealousy — which produced the tragedies of Hamlet, Macbeth, and Othello. What was the *hamartia* of the wartime Menzies? Mr. Hasluck suggests that it was the lack of "the humbler arts of political management." This was true enough, but elsewhere he concludes that Menzies, suffering from detraction, was "unable to establish positively a different reputation for himself by either the attractiveness or the force of his own nature. He thus did not have and could not command the trust or seize the imagination of the people and hence inspire them to an undivided war effort under his leadership." The question goes deeper into personality, since Churchill in England and Curtin later in Australia provided a successful war leadership which rested, not upon political management, but upon a personality that commanded the confidence of the people.

March, 1954

The Rise Of Curtin

The political era of 1939-41 presented clashes between personalities rather than policies, and one of the most interesting aspects of Mr. Hasluck's book is his assessment of political figures. Thus the virtues and limitations of Lyons are set out sympathetically, and favourable verdicts are passed on Casey and Street, Fairbairn and Gullett and, on the Labour side, on Chifley and Dedman. The thumbnail sketch of Sir Arthur Fadden is neatly executed, but there was obvious difficulty in dealing with Sir Earle Page. There is scant patience for the class consciousness of Mr. Ward, but his vigour as a Minister is recognized. The contempt for the U.A.P. rebels is scarcely disguised, and there is an astringent note in all references to Dr. Evatt.

After Mr. Menzies, however, the figure which commands attention is Mr. Curtin, since the book which chronicles the fall of the former is also an account of the latter's rise. There is a critical analysis of the changes in Mr. Curtin's views on defence matters, but the points of consistency are fairly recognized. The treatment of Mr. Curtin is an objective one, without favour or prejudice, so that it says much for him that the record alone is eloquent of his rise in stature, his patient and devoted work in building up party unity, and the impeccable quality of his patriotism in the manner that he put the country before party as Leader of the Opposition and as member of the Advisory War Council. In 1940, as the election results indicated, he had not impressed himself upon the people as the natural war leader, whereas later, by the 1943 elections, he won the day largely on the personal confidence which he commanded. That story is one for Mr. Hasluck's next volume, but the record in this first volume leaves one with the feeling that amidst the political turmoil and the rather low level of politics the character of Curtin stands out as exceptional in its fineness, commanding the highest respect.

The People At War

It is impossible to comment, of course, on the hundred and one matters of importance and interest handled by Mr. Hasluck in his large volume. The two digressive chapters on manpower and resources and on wartime administration make heavy reading, and their interruption to the political story might possibly have been avoided by some other arrangement. Both were considered necessary, both are packed with detailed information, and the survey of administration offers shrewd and stimulating comments.

On the other hand, the introductory outline of defence policy and rearmament between the two world wars makes intensely interesting reading. Here the historian had to do pioneering research, and the result was well worth the efforts. Notable features here are the critical analysis of Labour defence policy, the disparity between rearmament programmes and performances, the comparative failure in general of the Lyons Government to work out an adequate foreign policy and to link it with defence policy despite some interesting excursions into international affairs, and the failure of efforts to secure a satisfactory form of Imperial consultation on foreign affairs.

Finally, there remains the question of how the Australian people reacted to the war. The picture drawn is not a happy one in many respects, like the story of the political shenanigan in Canberra. To begin with, there was no mutual trust between the Government and the people. "One feature that emerges most clearly from a close review of the wartime political scene is an expectation by the men in Canberra that the Australian people might behave badly. It was not peculiar to one party nor to one phase of the war." Government and people both had a low opinion of each other — not without justification in each case. Mr. Hasluck puts his finger on a vital point when he justly observes that "During the first period of the war until Dunkirk, or perhaps even longer, the memory of the depression was probably as powerful a determinant of Australian conduct as the peril of war." From the depression came a legacy of doubt, suspicion, fear for individual security with consequent stress on self-interest, and a poor national morale. Almost equally potent, probably, although Mr. Hasluck does not develop this point, were the division and suspicion sown by the creed of class warfare, which made it difficult for any Government to secure a true national unity. Another factor was what W. K. Hancock called the "credulous cynicism" about politics in Australia, where "Government, being constantly overstrained, is constantly discredited."

Mr. Hasluck points out the prevalence of apathy and greed. Prominent among the first responses to the war were the many selfish agitations of sectional interests, reminding one of Bryce's dictum made many years ago of Australia as "the country in which material interests have most dominated politics." On the other hand, Mr. Hasluck observes shrewdly that the fault here was not entirely that of the people. If the pressures from interested groups were constant, "this was probably, in part, a public response to the way politics was being conducted. When a nation hangs out the sign, 'Politics as Usual,' it may expect the old customers to turn up at the usual hours with the usual requests to be served."

The nation was confused by the international uncertainties of "the twilight war" in Europe and Japan's possible movements in the Far East.

March, 1954

"Materially and spiritually," Mr. Hasluck declares, "it was unprepared for war." On the other hand, he preserves a balanced outlook and stresses the fact that many of the people had answered the national challenge with sacrifices and service of all kinds. By the end of 1941 much had been accomplished on the defence and industrial fronts: "The steeply-rising curve of the war effort at the end of 1941 can be traced through the actual expenditure from all sources on defence and war services from £55,715,000 in 1939-40 to £170,829,000 in 1940-41 and at a rate from July to November 1941 equivalent to £233,532,000 a year. About 420,000 men were directly engaged in the fighting Services and munitions production, nearly all of them having been recruited since the start of the war."

A Copland memorandum of December, 1941, summarised the almost spectacular increase in the munitions effort, the establishment of many new industries, and the expansion of the Bren gun and aircraft production. Professor Copland as Economic Consultant reported that "The speed with which these industries have reached mass production stage has amazed even the experts brought out to supervise the expansion. The Australian workman, quite unused to the high degree of precision needed in war goods production has responded magnificently to the intense training necessary to equip him for this task. At the outbreak of war, by far our worst and most fundamental deficiency was in machine tools. We had one manufacturer of lathes, two of power presses and one government machine tools factory. We had relied almost exclusively on overseas supplies and these soon gave out. By the end of 1940 we were practically self-sufficient and had over 30 firms turning out machine tools. The production of munitions in 1940-41 is eighteen times that in 1938-39."

By the entry of Japan four divisions of the Second A.I.F. were in the field, an armoured division was being formed, and three divisions had acquitted themselves well in Greece, Crete, Syria, and the Western Desert. Units of the Air Force had fought in the Battle of Britain, and of the Navy in the Red Sea and Mediterranean. Over 424,000 men had been mobilised for the Services at home and abroad, and Mr. Hasluck comments that "In proportion to total population, this was equivalent to a mobilisation of 3,000,000 British under arms or 9,500,000 Americans under arms. The actual figure for Great Britain in the middle of 1941 was 3,800,000 under arms and for the United States in the middle of 1943, 9,200,000 under arms." This comparison is illuminating. It shows that, despite many defects in politics and the public response, both the Australian Government and the Australian people had solid achievements to their credit.

NOTES

Full Employment In International Affairs

By R. H. Byrnes

Introduction

THE depression was largely responsible for the spread of the idea that Governments should accept responsibility for maintaining full employment. After 1935 J. M. Keynes and his school of economists secured wide acceptance for theories which claimed that it is possible to maintain full employment by policies designed to create and maintain effective demand. In this way it was believed that the cycles of boom and depression which had apparently been inherent in capitalism could be prevented. An increase in government controls over key sectors of the economy and probably also considerably increased taxation would be the main requirements for such a policy.

The war accustomed people to considerable government control of their affairs and raised taxation to unprecedented heights. It also eliminated unemployment and an attempt to continue wartime full employment in the postwar world became likely.

However, it was realised that one country could only maintain full employment with great difficulty and in most cases at a much lower standard of living if other Governments were not doing likewise. It was especially important that the United States and other major industrial powers should maintain full employment if the economies of countries mainly supplying raw materials were to maintain full employment at an adequate living standard. Accordingly an attempt was made to bind governments to international obligations to maintain full employment.

Government Policies

The U.S. Government's declaration of policy is contained in Section 2 of the Employment Act of 1946. It states: "It is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practical means—to co-ordinate and utilize all its plans, functions and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment for those able, willing and seeking work and to promote maximum employment pro-

March, 1954

duction and purchasing power." The President submits to Congress in the Annual State of the Union Message a statement concerning the level of employment together with proposed measures for alleviating unemployment if required. In practice the U.S. Government has favoured a high level of employment as an objective, rather than absolute 100% full employment and believed that a reduction of trade barriers and freer international trade was the best method of promoting it internationally.

The U.K. Government policy is set out in the White Paper on Employment Policy tabled in the House of Commons in May, 1944. It was realised that U.K. domestic policy would not ensure full employment and international action to this end was supported. The Beveridge Report published about this time gave 3% as the lowest level of unemployment which could be permanently achieved.

The Australian Government policy is set out in a paper, Full Employment in Australia, tabled in Parliament in May, 1945. It defined full employment as "a tendency towards a shortage of men rather than a shortage of jobs." It went into some detail as to the measures necessary and set out as the Australian Government's policy "to seek agreement now with other nations by which countries undertake to do all in their power to maintain employment within their own territories."

In general it should be noted that most governments do not consider full employment to mean 100% of the labour force employed but make allowance for transfers from job to job and seasonal workers. The qualifications in favour of "free competitive enterprise" in the U.S. should also be noted. Most other governments are more prepared to maintain full employment at the expense of "free competitive enterprise" if forced to choose between the two.

Full Employment Clauses

As early as the U.K.-U.S.A. Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942 there was a clause providing for action directed to the expansion by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods.

At the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia, in May and June, 1943, the Australian Delegation raised the question of full employment very vigorously somewhat to the surprise of some other delegations. Full employment clauses were agreed to in both the resolutions and recommendations of the Conference but Dr. Coombs reported differences of opinion on the relative importance of domestic measures to achieve a high level of employment and measures to reduce international trade barriers. When the time came to develop the

Food and Agriculture Organisation from these recommendations, the responsibility for full employment had been transferred to other international organisations.

The Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January, 1944, contained a full employment clause. This, of course had little effect apart from expressing the belief of both Governments in the usefulness of these clauses as instruments of international policy.

The International Labour Conference in April and May, 1944, adopted a Declaration of Principles for the International Labour organisation. "Full employment and the raising of standards of living" became the first objective of the organisation. At this conference Australia and New Zealand pressed for an international agreement on full employment.

The Bretton Woods Conference in July, 1944, drew up the articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, including a clause "to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income." This clause reflects more strongly than the charter of the U.N. and the constitutions of other international organisations the views of the U.S. Government on full employment and the method by which it should be obtained.

When the San Francisco Conference considered the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in April, May and June, 1945, Australia took a leading part and in articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter achieved the objective of an international agreement on full employment in fairly full measure. However, the obligation is on member States to take national action in co-operation with the U.N. to promote full employment. The action is decided by member governments after considering recommendations of the U.N. whose duty is to study the position, make recommendations and keep public opinion mobilised. Full employment is not a matter in which the sovereignty of member governments has been reduced by joining U.N., and a formula which would have required national action for the purposes of maintaining full employment was defeated. A national government secure in its support from its electorate could therefore quite safely ignore the recommendations of U.N. despite the effect this might have on other economies. An effort to replace the words "full employment" by the words "a high level of employment" was also defeated.*

* Article 55: With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: (a) higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development. (55 b. relates to economic, social, health, cultural and educational matters and 55 c. to human rights and fundamental freedoms.)

Article 56: All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

March, 1954

The Charter of the International Trade Organisations was drawn up by the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment at Havana in 1948. It aimed at the reduction of tariffs and trade barriers and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. However the maintenance of full employment was recognised as a valid reason for the imposition of fresh tariffs, trade barriers and discriminatory practices. The charter did not come into force due to lack of ratification by the U.S. and other major powers. But as a result of the negotiations a number of governments signed and ratified the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This provides an opportunity for regular tariff negotiations and the extension of fresh concessions granted to all other contracting parties. GATT is a flexible instrument containing a provision for bringing into force those sections of the Havana Charter which a majority of governments consider necessary. Approval has been received for other forms of restriction permitted by the Havana Charter and it seems probable that approval would be forthcoming if a country or group of countries had to impose restrictions to maintain full employment.

Of these numerous clauses the articles of the U.N. Charter are the most important although action taken under both the IMF and GATT clauses could have considerable effect.

Subsequent Action

A functional U.N. Economic and Employment Commission was established acting under the Economic and Social Council and it in turn proliferated into two subcommissions. In March, 1947, the Commission was asked to report on the most appropriate forms of international action. Following this report the Secretary General was requested to obtain from member governments details of action to achieve and maintain full employment and economic stability and plans to prevent a future decline in employment. As a result governments are annually requested to complete a questionnaire which asks numbers of searching questions covering the whole range of economic policy and objectives as well as specific issues connected with employment. In fact only about half of the U.N. members have completed the questionnaire.

During the second half of 1948 and the first six months of 1949 it became evident that the postwar boom was over. In the U.S. there was an increase in unemployment from 2 million to 3.5 million or about 5.7% of the labour force. There was a 12% fall in industrial production in the U.S. and imports fell by 15% with imports from Western Europe falling by over one third. The dollar balances of most countries fell seriously and currency depreciation due to various factors began to appear inevitable. Serious increases in unemployment were evident in

Belgium and Switzerland and were only prevented in the rest of Europe by the amount of postwar reconstruction still in progress. The U.N. Secretary General set up an expert committee which produced a report on "National and International Measures for Full Employment."

The main recommendation of the committee was the establishment of a full employment standard by each member government together with a comprehensive programme for directing the fiscal and monetary policies, investment and production planning and wage and price policies to the continuous achievement of the full employment objective. In addition the committee recommended the governments prepare in advance measures for maintaining full employment should its other measures fail to prevent the target from being exceeded for three successive months. The need to maintain a stable price level, prevent inflationary tendencies, adopt legislative processes, administrative organisation and statistical methods so that the policy could be implemented was also stressed. To meet the balance of payments crisis the committee suggested a special supplementary fund of foreign exchange to be available through the IMF to assist countries, facing a recession originating outside their boundaries, in maintaining their level of import purchases. This fund was only to be repaid if in a subsequent period the exchange position was reversed. For stabilizing investment the committee provided that countries should be asked to fix for five years ahead the sums to be invested abroad on public and private account.

As a result of the report the Economic and Social Council recast the questionnaire, particularly desiring information on employment standards and measures to ensure that the target was maintained. Member governments were recommended to achieve a high level in their balance of payments and maintain a high level of investment. Suggestions for special supplements of foreign exchange and investment targets were not acceptable to the major powers and were not adopted. The only Government prepared to establish a full employment standard has been the United Kingdom which gave as its standard the 3% figure mentioned in the Beveridge Report. The Committee believed that the establishment of a standard would mean that governments would be bound to maintain a policy aimed at full employment but the governments have simply avoided the obligation. Apparently the electorates of other countries are not sufficiently enlightened for their governments to make a public statement of the degree of unemployment which they consider normal.

This report is probably the clearest statement of the theory behind the doctrine of full employment in international affairs, and its recommendations were an able, but unsuccessful, attempt to implement it. Of course the outbreak of the Korean war shortly afterwards removed the

March, 1954

need for the policy to be implemented then and labour shortages became more general than unemployment in many countries. However, serious unemployment still existed in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Austria in 1950 and 1951 although it didn't affect the world position.

In August, 1951, the Economic and Social Council amended the questionnaire to deal with employment and under-employment in under-developed countries and of eliminating obstacles to economic development emphasising a further aspect of the problem of full employment which is not met in Western countries. Many governments were developing policies in 1951 to restrain consumer demand mainly by fiscal measures with the object of preventing or lessening inflation. In some countries these policies met with considerable opposition, showing that cyclical fluctuations are not as easy to dampen as had been supposed.

During 1952 there was a fall in the prices of many commodities internationally traded and balance of payments difficulties in some countries. However the level of employment in the major countries remained high. Some of the measures restricting inflation have been relaxed but others are still in force. The Armistice in Korea will probably accelerate these relaxations but the co-ordination of the development of civilian demand and the slackening of the military effort may well be too difficult for governments and some amount of unemployment may occur.

Future Prospects

The Eisenhower Administration is on record as promising government action if necessary to prevent a depression in a declaration of responsibility that goes further than the Employment Act of 1946. However Dr. Arthur F. Burns, President Eisenhower's economic adviser, has stated his belief that the "economic system will continue to generate business cycles" and that "deep but brief contractions such as occurred in 1920-21 and 1937-38 cannot be said to be unlikely to occur again." "Experience of counter cyclical policy does not provide strong support for the belief that the Government is capable of adjusting its spending, taxing and regulatory policies with the fine precision and promptness needed to ensure virtually full employment and a stable price level at all times." When the complexities of policy making and legislation in the U.S. are considered this seems an eminently reasonable forecast of events.

In general therefore it cannot be said that international efforts to maintain full employment are as yet, likely to succeed. It might be wise to expect slumps of greater severity than that of 1949/50 with temporary levels of unemployment of say up to 12% in the U.S. Devaluation of currencies offers less prospects than it did in 1949 and there is now little postwar reconstruction in progress except in Korea. Accordingly

some quantity of unemployment or at best full employment at lowered standards of living seems quite possible.

This possibility might well place some strain on the existing anti-Soviet alliance and encourage the anti-American forces which exist in most western countries. However any Soviet action to take advantage of this strain would probably lead to a rapid reversal of the trend, some further re-armament and a return to full employment.

Naguib: A Study In Loyalty *

By Maurice Adams

IT was Benjamin Disraeli—the only man in the England of the late nineteenth century to realise the vital importance of the Suez Canal—who half a century earlier had said: “Man is not the creature of circumstances; circumstances are the creatures of men.”

This assertion was completely contradicted less than two years ago when a man—who is now master over the future destiny of the Suez Canal—is clearly the creature of circumstances.

That man is General Mohamed Naguib, first President and Prime Minister of the first Republic of Egypt.

Had Farouk not earned for himself the odious constitutional epitaph that he was both “a bad king and a bad subject,” Naguib might still to-day be another loyal officer obeying the commands of his Royal Commander-in-Chief.

As it was, the dangerous drift towards national corruption and mal-administration of the country led a group of young Egyptian Army officers to choose Naguib as their leader in the coup d’etat of July, 1952, to put an end to the “lust and tyranny”—to use Naguib’s own words—of the playboy King.

The coup was in later months to release a chain of reactions which smashed all political parties, scrapped the Constitution of 1923 and abolished the monarchy in a country famous throughout history for its pharaohs and kings.

Evidence appears to support strongly the claim repeatedly made by Naguib that it was circumstances which forced him into the position of dictator of Egypt.

He had not intended to become the ruler of his country. His aim was

* The above was written four weeks before the last month’s developments in Egypt. Maurice Adams—Former Reuter’s Correspondent in the Middle East; A.B.C. News Commentator; author of a number of “Current Affairs Bulletins” on Middle Eastern affairs; now on “The Sydney Morning Herald” staff.

March, 1954

to rid it of the cancer of corruption and to nurse it back on the road to political sanity and national pride.

The exile of Farouk turned out to be only the first operation in the process. Naguib soon after discovered that the cancer was of a malignant nature, and therefore decided to dissect the body politic in order to save the patient. Hence his dissolution of the powerful Wafd, and, more recently, of the fanatical Moslem Brotherhood.

But if Naguib is a creature of circumstances, he also appears to be a creature of fate.

Viewed in retrospect, his ancestry, his birth, his youth, his training and his studies seem to have been guided by the unseen hand of destiny in order to prepare him for the role which was to be thrust upon him by a strange (though not unusual) combination of bad kingship and a soldier's patriotism.

Even if—in our cynical age—we refuse to believe that the assumption of supreme political power can be forced on a reluctant leader who continues to proclaim his altruistic motives, no one—not even his bitterest political enemies—can doubt Naguib's sincerity of purpose and loyalty to his country.

This sense of loyalty, in a country where for generations loyalty was equated with submission to power, was so ingrained in Naguib that he did not hesitate to betray his King in order to be loyal to his subjects.

To him this was no political paradox—it was a tactical move dictated by political patriotism.

Yet 14 years earlier, when Farouk—then only 19—embodied the national aspirations and hopes of all Egyptians, when he was regarded as the symbolic morning star that would lead Egypt into brighter and better days, Naguib paid his King the highest honour which a humble Moslem citizen could perform. He named his first son after Farouk.

This he did in the same sense of loyalty which, just over a decade later, turned into revulsion.

General Mohamed Naguib (Naguib is the Arabic for "excellent") was born in 1901 in Khartoum, the eldest of a family of three sons and six daughters of an Egyptian officer and a Sudanese mother. As was to be expected, after the coup d'état his birth was regarded to be the living personification of that "unity of the Nile Valley" which had plagued Anglo-Egyptian relations over the Sudan ever since the day he was born.

This mixture of Egyptian and Sudanese blood may explain the dark cast of the Middle Nile in his sultry, hard-bitten face, as well as the deep sense of loyalty for which the Sudanese are renowned. His beetling brows tend to hide the generous eyes of the Sudanese people, but not the

traditional Sudanese suspicion of pomp and human idolatry. He is a sturdily built man of average height, with a clipped grey moustache and closely cropped black hair shot with grey.

Soldiering is in his blood. His maternal grandfather, a Lieutenant-Colonel, fought and died alongside General Gordon in the bloody siege of Khartoum in 1895. His father, Captain Youssef Naguib, marched with Lord Kitchener—when Winston Churchill was a war correspondent—to reconquer the Sudan from the Mahdi three years later.

Fittingly, Mohamed received his early education at Khartoum where he was a student at Gordon College, built as a memorial to General Gordon. His father wanted him to take up law, but always the thought of emulating his father's and grandfather's military exploits haunted the young Mohamed. Despite the added opposition from his mother, he eventually decided on a military career.

After making the thousand-mile journey to Cairo partly on foot and by camel and partly by steamer down the Nile, he sought admission to the Royal Military Academy. But because he was only 5ft 6in tall, he was rejected. For months Mohamed then practised stretching exercises five times a day. He increased his height by only half an inch, and though this was still half an inch below the acceptable height he was admitted.

At the Academy he literally raced through courses in tactics, discipline, military law and history in about nine months instead of the usual two and a half years. He passed out as a second-lieutenant at 19.

Posted first in the infantry and later in the cavalry, Naguib sought to improve himself by learning English, French, German and Italian, to become one of the best linguists in the Middle East. He also took diplomas in political economy and law. Since then he has added Hebrew to his list of languages.

It was the Palestine war in 1948—after an unspectacular military career—that provided the mental impetus for the revolution four years later.

As commander of front-line shock troops he saw his men being killed by faulty ammunition supplied by the Cairo politicians and courtiers seeking personal enrichment. Once he had his pipe shot out of his mouth in the fighting and later he was severely wounded.

When the fighting was over he joined the secret society of "Free Officers" whose avowed aim was to rid the country of Farouk and his regime.

Restored to health a few months later, he was appointed Director of Training and was elected President of the Officer's Club in Cairo.

After the sacking of Cairo in January, 1952, which brought about the downfall of the Wafd, the new Prime Minister, Sirry Pasha, sought to appoint Naguib as War Minister.

March, 1954

Farouk instead appointed Ismail Sherine Pasha, who had married his sister, Princess Fawzia, after her divorce from the Shar of Persia. Farouk thus hoped to control the Army through his brother-in-law. But the rumblings of discontent in the Army grew, and the King closed the Officer's Club which, he suspected, was fomenting the unrest.

This was the spark that set the officers' revolution into motion and that has since cost Farouk his throne and changed the political complexion of Egypt.

But for all the power and glory which are now his, Naguib the man has not changed his life or habits. If anything, he drives himself harder with a self-imposed military discipline that baffles foreign observers.

He has declined suggestions that he turn one of Farouk's former palaces into another "White House." He is quite content to go on living in his modest villa at Zeitoun, a Cairo suburb, with his wife and three sons. One of his first acts after the coup d'etat was to change his eldest son's name from Farouk to Salah el Din.

His day begins punctually at 7 and ends well after midnight. That he is the hardest-working and most popular man in Egypt today there can be little doubt. He has already travelled the length and breadth of the country, seeing as many of the 22 million Egyptians as has been physically possible. He attracts thousands of people wherever he goes. They clutch at his clothes, throw themselves at his feet and try to kiss his hands. "Hail to Mohamed Naguib who saved Egypt" is now a common cry in the city streets, villages, factories and schools of Egypt.

Whether he has saved Egypt or not it is too early to say. The tasks facing him are frightening. His ambitious land reform project has not yet completely succeeded. The vast majority of Egyptians are poor, illiterate and riddled with endemic diseases. Egypt's foreign policy lacks stability and purpose, mainly because it awaits a satisfactory solution to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the future of the Suez Canal base, and also because no basis has yet been found for Egypt's (and the Arab world's) relations with the new State of Israel.

Essentially, Naguib's task is not only to rid the country of corruption and poverty and generally to raise its standard of living. His is the task of changing old values for new, of eradicating old political prejudices and practices and of establishing new national virtues, of discarding fanatic shauvinism in favour of genuine patriotism, and of imposing authoritarian, if austere, government in the interests of all, in place of the prodigality and sham grandeur of the few.

In the execution of these almost superhuman tasks Naguib may yet make two fatal mistakes: Firstly, in his zeal and enthusiasm he may be tempted to impose burdens on his people without having first ascertained

the strength of the moral fabric of those on whom they are to be imposed. And secondly, having contradicted Disraeli, he may fail to disprove Lord Acton's dictum that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

If he can steer clear of these two danger signals, the verdict of history on Naguib may one day read something like this: He was loyal first to his King, then to his kinsmen and country in a society where loyalty was wanting, if not lacking; he was upright and honest in a society founded on corruption and perfidy; he was earnestly industrious among men who excelled in idleness and seeking self-aggrandisement; and lastly, he undertook to accelerate the process of historical evolution in a part of the world that had known only historical stagnation.

Mohamed the "excellent" is fighting almost a one-man battle, not so much for Mohamed the Prophet as for Mohamed the fellah.

If he succeeds, he will rank amongst the modern heroes of Islam and as one of the benefactors of his fellow men.

If he fails, he will at least have tried where others—more powerful than him—have even failed to try.

Conference At New York

By T. N. M. Buesst.

October 20-31, 1953

THE actual conference, convened by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, first assembled at a luncheon, followed by an address by Professor James T. Shotwell, on Tuesday, October 20th. But most of us had been present at a dedication ceremony the day before, at which the new twelve-storey building of the Endowment had formally been declared open. This impressive ceremony, held in the open within a temporary enclosure on a sunny autumn afternoon, in the presence of a thousand invited guests, formed a fitting prelude to the events of the subsequent twelve days.

Known as the Carnegie Endowment International Centre, the new building provides office-space and assembly-rooms not only for the Endowment itself but also for a number of other cultural organisations. From the wide terrace on the top floor one looks out across First Avenue upon the cluster of buildings, only a little less recent in construction, that house in splendid isolation the United Nations. Andrew Carnegie established his Endowment, with a gift of ten million dollars, in the year 1910. If he could return to see this latest architectural monument to his munificence, would he not have every reason to be gratified? At our opening luncheon meeting, the leader of the Chatham House group (the

March, 1954

Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger M.P.) made graceful reference to the founder when responding to an address of welcome on behalf of the visiting delegates, and no more appropriate choice of spokesman could have been made, for Mr. Younger himself, as he informed us, like Andrew Carnegie, could claim Dunfermline as his birthplace.

In convening the conference, the governing body of the Endowment described it as designed to make possible an exchange of views and information between representatives of various unofficial organisations concerned with the study of international affairs, with the aim of rendering the efforts of those organisations more effective. "Those of us whose avowed purpose is the impartial examination of international issues and the providing of sound information as the basis for sober judgments," to quote the words of Mr. Edgar McInnis of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs—if we may so describe ourselves—were only too glad of the opportunity of meeting for mutual consultation the representatives of institutes similar to our own.

Twenty-three such unofficial organisations, in eighteen different countries other than the United States, accepted the invitation and sent representatives. Mr. Keith Aickin and I had the honour to represent the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and we were two of forty men and women who assembled in New York from abroad. The name given to the gathering may seem decidedly cumbersome, namely "Conference of Leaders of Institutes of World Affairs," but if anyone could have suggested a better one no doubt it would have been adopted readily enough.

The procedure varied little from session to session, each session lasting two hours or less. An authority on the subject under discussion would open the proceedings, generally supported by three or more "panel members," each briefly commenting on some aspect of the first speaker's remarks, whereafter a general debate would follow. Incidentally, the panel system, much in use in the United States, whereby the main speaker is followed by pre-selected coadjutors, might with advantage be adopted at meetings in Australia. The main speaker does not have to carry the whole burden unaided, while the panel members, being prepared, are likely to make a more valuable contribution than participants in the debate speaking extempore.

Although the conference had as its basic purpose a collective consideration of the aims and activities of our several institutes, by persons experienced in the running of those institutes, such more or less domestic issues occupied only a third of the time of the conference. Another section of the conference programme had as its main theme The Evolution of the United Nations, while still another was devoted to The Forces that Shape Foreign Policy in Democracies. The programme was thus divided into three fairly distinct parts, each of about three days' duration.

Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment, made a valuable contribution to the discussions on the United Nations with a paper dealing with the question of possible Charter revision. The conference delegates had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Hammarskjöld at a late-afternoon party which he gave for us in the United Nations building; and on another occasion of hearing him when he responded to the toast of honour at a dinner given in the Waldorf-Astoria under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association. Mrs. Pandit, as president of the General Assembly, also spoke on the latter occasion.

At one of the discussion sessions four members of the U.N. Secretariat took part. Some question concerning translations having been raised, Mr. Singer of the Secretariat informed us with a twinkle in his eye that translation difficulties had largely disappeared of recent years because everyone now spoke the international language—Broken English. But the Asian and European delegates at our conference expressed themselves so fluently and correctly that their English might well be described as unbroken; with the exception of a Greek delegate who did not trust his English and relied on French.

We passed to the next main theme, The Forces that Shape Foreign Policy, and an expedition by private bus to Princeton University, richly rewarding for more than one reason, enabled us to meet in session at Woodrow Wilson Hall—and incidentally to lunch in the delightful setting of the Princeton Inn. An address delivered by Mr. George F. Kennan contained a characteristically acute and lucid analysis of the influence of public opinion on the formulation of foreign policy. Another notable address was delivered, at the conclusion of a dinner given by the Council on Foreign Relations, by its president, Mr. Henry M. Wriston. We met and dined in the stately mansion in East 68th Street that serves as the Council's headquarters. The address, entitled *The Voices of America*, the text of which has since been published in *Foreign Affairs*, was distinguished alike for vigour of utterance and originality of ideas. Mr. Wriston spoke with such verve, indeed, that when at the end the chairman asked if anyone had any questions to ask, a delighted guest rose to say that he would like to ask one question—whether Mr. Wriston would repeat the whole speech.

At the last midday session, the significance of our "1953 international Conference of Institutes of International Affairs" was ably and wittily summed up by its secretary, Mr. Howard E. Wilson. He remarked that the conference could be described as "itself an experiment in international relations", which prompts the reflection that the course of those relations might run smoother if the secretarial work of international conferences could always be carried out with the general efficiency displayed by Mr. Wilson and the staff of the Carnegie Endowment.

BOOK REVIEWS

"THE SOUTH SEAS IN TRANSITION" by W. E. H. Stanner. Issued under the auspices of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Affairs and published by the Australasian Publishing Company. 1953. Pp. viii and 448. Three maps. Australian Published price, 50/- net.

SHORTLY after the war the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the American Institute of Pacific Relations commissioned the Australian Anthropologist, W. E. H. Stanner, to survey postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction in South-West Pacific dependencies. "The South Seas In Transition" (Australasian Publishing Company, Sydney 1953), which is the result of this study, is a notable contribution to the history and theory of colonialism. Because of certain features of style and vocabulary it is a difficult book, even for the specialist, but in the opinion of this reviewer, it should rank high on the required reading list of everyone interested in the South Pacific in particular, and in the problems of colonialism and "underdeveloped" areas in general. Perhaps the outstanding merit of this book is its "balance": the events and problems it discusses have been treated elsewhere by economists, political scientists, officials, journalists, anthropologists, etc., but in no other publication known to this reviewer have these matters been set forth and interpreted with such impartial comprehensiveness. This is not to say that the author indulges in what he terms "the careful silence" or "the agile verbal straddle"; on the contrary, he arrives at some very definite conclusions about the causes and sources of past and continuing difficulties, and these he states unequivocally and with convincing documentation.

The terms of reference for this study were "to examine the effects of the war on the indigenous communities, to study the problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to consider such problems in relation to principles of international responsibility and Trusteeship." The original intent was to extend the study to all the Pacific Island dependencies affected by the war, but for practical and theoretical reasons the scope was later narrowed to include only Papua-New Guinea, Fiji, and Western Samoa. This sensible decision permitted deeper inquiry while retaining many of the advantages of comparison. While it is, of course, true that these three British dependencies do not represent the full range of South Pacific situations, they nevertheless provide enough variation for the drawing of some generally valid conclusions.

Each of the dependencies is treated in much the same way, with sections on resources, ethnography, economics, administration, etc., as they were at the beginning of World War II; a section on locally important events during the war; and sections on postwar developments up to 1947, when most of the manuscript was written. Part IV sets forth the author's general conclusions about these dependencies in particular and about Trusteeship and colonial development in general. Various technical difficulties delayed publication until 1953, thus permitting the author to add some discussion of events up to 1951.

The descriptive and narrative portions of the book are characterised by minute detail and full statistical documentation (including 46 tables on topics ranging from "Distribution of Indentured Labour between Industries, Mandated Territory, 1940" and "Comparative Literacy of Fijians and Indians, 1946" to "Copra Exports from Samoa over Long-Term Price Phases, 1906-1945"). Because of the author's profession one is not surprised to note the understanding and skill with which he deals with matters of ethnography, population, native labour, education, and the like, but this reviewer was amazed and somewhat envious at his competence in dealing with matters of colonial finance. And it is exactly this competence in extra-anthropological matters, and the comprehensions that accompany it, which makes this book outstanding. (On second thought, there is nothing extra-anthropological about high finance or any other aspect of human relations; it is merely

surprising, because of its rarity, to meet up with an anthropologist who can and does apply the whole culture approach to large and very complex social units.) But let us consider some of the findings.

Papua-New Guinea is shown to be a large and literally unknown area, whose so called "riches" are more of a tenet of Australian faith than a proven fact. Before the war its plantations and mines provided a few whites with tidy fortunes, a few more with comfortable livings, and a still larger number with bare economic margins. Australians in general were only remotely aware of New Guinea; in the author's words, "—a majority of Australians between the wars might have denied in all innocence, even with a certain indignation, that the Commonwealth was a 'Colonial Power' at all." Even the Commonwealth Government's attitude towards its tropical dependencies can be described as having been forgetful and inattentive. Meanwhile, a small staff of officials and missionaries went about their jobs opening up new areas to proselytisation and labour recruitment, maintaining some equilibrium between the interests of white settlers and the supposed interests of natives, and dispensing small scatterings of "welfare." The more dramatic effects that the war had on this fairly stabilised situation are well known: the immense destruction of property, the large number of civilian and native casualties, etc. Less well publicised were the heroic and fairly successful efforts of officials and settlers to maintain some continuity of native administration and some production of critically needed exports.

Meanwhile the Commonwealth Government became concerned with its strategic weaknesses and its role as a trustee of native peoples to a degree that can only be described as over-compensatory, and Dr. Evatt's activities in the international forum were backed up by an extraordinary amount of planning for a postwar New Guinea, where strategic interests and native welfare would be paramount. Unfortunately for these plans, the war ended so abruptly and the military forces were evacuated so precipitously that what remained of the New Guinea administrations were unable to cope with the massive everyday urgencies, let alone the demands of an almost revolutionary reconstruction plan.

Dr. Stanner then goes on to relate how one after another well-intentioned and generously financed but frantically formulated project became wrecked on the shoals of New Guinea's realities. A few programmes managed to survive, and by 1951 were beginning to show small but hopeful returns. On the other hand, the expectations fostered by some of the reconstruction schemes and processes served to exacerbate pathological social phenomena which were already present among a few native societies before the war. (Social scientists will find the author's chapter on New Guinea Vailala "madness" and Cargo Cults highly informative and provocative.) The picture is a discouraging one, and the author does not attempt to brighten it by offering new master plans. In fact, he implies that many of the problems facing Australia in Papua-New Guinea (and this applies to all colonial areas) are quite insoluble, however "enlightened" the policy and however skilled the administration. These he calls the "perennial" problems facing colonial administration and the development of "backward" areas: the characteristics of native cultures and societies in such areas, and the numerous economic and social features which go to make up the colonial pattern. These problems are particularly thorny in New Guinea, with its exceedingly numerous and minute native social units, its technological primitiveness, its unresponsive motivational systems, all added to the territories' environmental difficulties and the inaccessibility of their proved exploitable natural resources. Papua-New Guinea is also faced by what the author calls problems of a "contingent" nature (i.e., those which are "eminently reducible by known and proven means in specific circumstances") and those of an "inveterate" nature (i.e., one which may be "either a perennial (problem) given a new and puzzling quality by the dilapidation-development sequence, or a contingent so entrenched by interests that it may be kept in being even when recognised as a problem"). In other words, colonies in general and Papua-New Guinea in particular will always be "imperfect" — will always have perennial problems; and they will only become less imperfect through

informed and skilful attack on contingent problems. Dr. Stanner's criticisms of postwar developments in Papua-New Guinea seem to centre mainly on the wasted efforts and resources and the consequent dislocations which have resulted from officialdom's lack of knowledge of the full range of the problems it faced and lack of recognition of its own inevitable limitations in dealing with them.

Fiji's most vexing "perennial" problem would appear to be the progressively conflicting interests of the native Fijians and the immigrant Indians; both of these populations are increasing in numbers and in opposing aspirations to a degree that will inevitably lead to crisis — unless of course, processes now barely detectable transform the Fijian and Indian cultures so markedly that the bases of conflict disappear. Dr. Stanner describes the causes and the ramifications of this situation with characteristic thoroughness and balance, and he pays high tribute to the skill of British officials in finding solutions not only for many of the "contingent" problems of Fiji, but also for their efforts to provide the native Fijians with better defences against the more aggressive and resourceful Indians. (On this issue of Fijian versus Indian, Dr. Stanner momentarily drops his usual impartiality and joins most other writers on Fiji in their sympathy for the native Fijians.)

In other respects the author concedes Fiji a more favourable developmental "stance" than New Guinea — its populations being more capable and better integrated, its economic institutions being more highly organised, and its colonial administrators more experienced.

Dr. Stanner's chapters on Western Samoa serve to bring up to date Keesing's classic study of that dependency and to draw more into the open the reasons why New Zealand has found it a next to impossible task to satisfy all the aspirations of the Samoans and at the same time carry out the obligations of responsible trusteeship. It is a most unfair judgment to state, as many writers do, that New Zealand has completely failed in her administration of Samoa. It is true that relations between the colonial authorities and the Samoan leaders have gone through periods of strain, conflict, and even bloody strife. Nevertheless, under New Zealand's guardianship, the Samoans have remained fairly healthy, and they have increased greatly in numbers, experienced much prosperity, and won political concessions possibly beyond their abilities to utilise. Still unsatisfied, however, are the Samoans' aspirations for complete self-government (though not for independence).

Here is New Zealand's dilemma: in Samoan society, political and social power reside in a number of title-holders who reach their positions both by family membership and political manoeuvre; and in many respects this institution has lost none of its strength in the last hundred years. The essentially egalitarian New Zealanders have either failed to recognise the strength of this institution, or, recognising it, have been unwilling to turn over government of all the Samoan people to a hierarchy of title-holders which, though containing many able and statesmanlike men, is essentially unstable, autocratic, self-seeking, and in many individual cases, incompetent and corrupt. Which is the better course of action: to grant the demands for self-government of the articulate but possibly too irresponsible few; or to maintain some measure of control for what is thought to be the welfare of the whole population? This problem dominates all other considerations of Trusteeship and development. Consider the matter of population. Samoans, already numbering over 70,000, are increasing "at a rate of growth so rapid that it should double the number in about 28 years, if vital conditions remain fairly constant." The author reports that a total population of 250,000 before the end of the century is said to be predictable, an expansion probably beyond the supporting limits of their islands' limited resources, unless some fundamental changes are made in Samoan technology and economy. Can the authorities risk turning over to the Samoans this fateful problem? Or again, in connection with economic matters, during recent years the active world demand for Samoa's primary export products, copra and cocoa, has brought large incomes to Samoan producers,

but this prosperity has been dissipated in ways that throw serious doubt upon the Samoans' ability and motives to administer finances in the manner required of the modern government of even a microscopic South Seas state.

The author's final chapters, on "Implications," treat with the subjects of Trusteeship, regionalism, and development, in a world-wide context. His critique of Trusteeship leaves no doubt about his own opinions on this subject. On the one hand he makes some rather devastating jibes at the well-meaning but entirely unrealistic political protagonists of the "mystique" of Trusteeship, who gather at the "centres of international enthusiasm" and plan for "desirable but non-existent societies" and who act on the assumption that there exist omniscient experts "who know precisely what to do to solve colonial problems." On the other hand he has some words of praise for the work of technicians associated with the United Nations technical and specialised agencies ("which have done more to clarify basic problems over a few years than all the other colonial bureaux put together"). He notes, however, that these informed and practical efforts to solve departmental colonial problems are becoming increasingly hamstrung by the growth of faction in the political bodies of the U.N. And in any case, he adds that the activities of the U.N. technical and specialised agencies have had little effect among the Pacific dependencies, due partly to preoccupation with larger and more urgent issues elsewhere and partly to South Seas officials being unaware of the services available to them.

Dr. Stanner does not appear to disapprove of the commonly understood objectives of Trusteeship; he merely calls for more effective applications in terms of the particular circumstances of each territory and its people. Here, the central problem, as he sees it, lies in "the means of transfer to the masses of island people of motives, of credibility sufficient to enlist their willing support of Trusteeship programmes." These and the other problems of application call for planning based on grass-roots research — "an entirely frank study of factual conditions" which would include, of course, an examination of native ethos as well as the more customary surveys of physical resources and limitations. For these purposes he states the need for a practical guide-book on developmental problems, analysing both failure and success in given situations. In this connection, the reviewer would like to draw attention to the fact that some such guides are now in existence and others are in preparation. (For example: "Human Problems In Technological Change," edited by E. H. Spicer, New York, 1952; Professor C. M. Arensburg's handbook on the anthropological context of "Point Four Programs" (in press); and "Human Organisation," the quarterly organ of the Society of Applied Anthropology (New York), to mention only three. Also, many valuable leads are to be expected from the practical experiments in inter-cultural transfer of techniques being conducted in several economically backward areas by Cornell University, (Ithaca, New York)).

We cannot begin to summarise in a review the author's many general findings and suggestions concerning the many-faceted topic of "Development," so must be content with quoting his estimate of the scope of the fiscal aspect of the problem, and, he points out, this is by no means the most difficult aspect; the ethnographic aspect being, if anything, wider in scope and far less susceptible to guided transformation.

"A world programme of some £100,000 millions over the next 75 years for all underdeveloped territories, might produce some, but no great results, if (and it is a very large if) the West could spare the funds. This would allow, say, £1 of new capital annually per head of present populations. This is a scale and rate which would probably throw out of gear the whole balance of capital-consumer goods production and the investment programmes of several metropolitan countries, though but a small percentage of their current national incomes, and could have an important effect on the amount of investment capital available for other uses.

"The purely economic implication is that the islanders are likely to remain much poorer, on the average, than people are, on the average, in metropolitan

March, 1954

countries. The solutions of their problems inevitably involve the redistribution of some metropolitan prosperity. We do not need to be told that his also is far from being a solely economic problem."

Finally, in view of the author's wide knowledge and practical experience in the colonial field it is particularly interesting to learn his opinion about prospects:

"The one 'new concept' of colonialism, capable of transforming the scene from what it actually is into what is implied by the methods now followed, might seem to be to allow the absorption of each colonial people to some one coherent, modern metropolitan society, in which the major cultural integrities of modern life may still be found. The attainment of this relation might, theoretically, allow the redistribution of metropolitan real welfare in more conclusive, systematic ways than are now possible. It might also, theoretically, provide the best of an always difficult set of conditions for the development of a seminal, unified colonial culture in each territory. But it appears at present unattainable, except with penal stratifications by racial caste and economic class."

Needless to add, this is not the concept which guides the makers and administrators of policy in the three dependencies described in this book.

Harvard University.

Douglas L. Oliver

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN MELANESIA: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH, by A. P. Elkin. Published under the auspices of the South Pacific Commission. Oxford University Press, London, Melbourne, New York, 1953. Pp. xiii, 166 Maps. Price 27/6.

THIS book is a report, originally made to the South Pacific Commission, on the present state and future possibilities of social anthropology in Melanesia. It falls into three parts. In the first, Professor Elkin discusses briefly the main types of writings on Melanesian peoples. Explorers, administrators and missionaries have contributed much background knowledge and a few penetrating analyses. But their different interests, lack of anthropological training, or short stays in any one area have militated against work of a scientific as well as a practical nature. Anthropologists, on the other hand, have studied societies as functioning wholes in the last decades, but have not, until recently, considered seriously enough the aspects of culture contact and change.

Professor Elkin next undertakes a detailed survey of social anthropological and related literature, presenting at the same time his comments on the work it represents, and suggestions for possible future research. The extraordinarily complex pattern of cultural differences in Melanesia presents difficulties in the organisation of such a wide review. The author has decided against a treatment by topics, as made by

Professor Keesing in the companion volume on Polynesia, and deals with each administrative district, and each sub-area within this division, in turn. This methodical approach is excellent and easy to follow. A reader without expert knowledge of the field cannot properly comment on the criteria of selection of "most, if not all, of the relevant literature." What strikes one is the preponderance, in many parts, of the writings of missionary, traveller and administrator, which Professor Elkin has already evaluated as being of doubtful value for the present purposes; as the author remarks, "the harvest is great, but the labourers few."

In the last part of the work, Professor Elkin lists various research projects which he considers especially important, grouped under five main types of study. There is the fieldwork undertaken in a "new" area, where there has been little contact with the West; there is the project oriented towards changes which have taken place over a period of years—this to be carried out in areas already covered between 1920 and 1935, preferably by the anthropologists who made these earlier studies; there are studies emphasising the changing aspects of native communities, but not following on a previous research effort—such studies can be made where there are "critical" changes like cargo cults, or where change appears to be less disruptive,

or where changes have been accompanied by depopulation and a rapid relinquishing of native custom. The relative priority given to the projects suggested will vary with the particular interests of each worker, and Professor Elkin himself adds that these are only suggested guides to planning.

To this reviewer, the book has two major aspects. One is as a work of reference. It is true that the survey of the areas and their literature is here made as a means leading to the recommendation of projects. But it could also form a most valuable reference work, if the bibliographies contained all major relevant material. For some gaps exist, as the author acknowledges. The list of works on Polynesian outliers is a case in point.

Reference to all major contributions might, by sheer volume, break up the continuity of the area-by-area survey, it is true. But a change of plan, with the text in one part and a full bibliography as an appendix, could overcome this difficulty. One might also suggest the inclusion of the administrative districts as subsection headings in the Table of Contents for easier reference, and possibly a larger scale map of at least Papua-New Guinea for the non-expert.

The second aspect of the book lies in its recommendations. Here, two comments may be made in the short space available. Professor Elkin is impressed with the relative superficiality of most anthropological work in the area. Researchers, he maintains, have analysed institutions and more overt phases of the culture, but have not gone deeper into systems of values and motivations. He pleads persuasively for fieldworkers who can spend five or six years in a single area, in two or three terms of work there. They would, at the same time, apply their knowledge of a single village to the wider linguistic and cultural area around them, the author having this in mind when selecting sites for future research. Such studies seem at present unlikely, however, for there are few academic institutions which could finance such lengthy periods of work by the same man. Anthropologists attached to Government, missions, or the South Pacific Commission, posts which Professor Elkin strongly recommends, would also be under pressure to include more than one community in five years of work. Still this aim may sometimes be achieved, should certainly never be forgotten, and we must be grateful to Professor Elkin for stressing it.

The other point which is forcibly made is that there should be a co-ordination of research; a consultative, if not directing, body should "ensure co-ordination in the study of similar and of different problems in different sub-regions." Active co-ordination, however, presupposes a likeness of both interests and theoretical approach which may be lacking over a wide range of researchers and institutions. Nevertheless, a form of co-ordination may well lie in the start of a cross-cultural survey, as made recently at the Australian National University. Whatever the emphasis of research, and the theoretical leanings of the workers, the data can hereby be put into a roughly comparable form, though the limitations of such a survey should be understood.

The more flexible alternative to a directing body is the circulation of reports by a consultative co-ordinator on work being carried out and the areas covered, and a suggested list of projects; and it is precisely in this light that Professor Elkin's book is relevant. A further edition might well include a complete list of current projects, set apart from the area-by-area survey. In the present book, for example, a list made in November, 1952, would include Burrridge's work in Tangu, then nearing completion. It would also be useful to have a list of institutions carrying out, or interested in, research in Melanesia; here, for instance, would be included the University of Pennsylvania, for which Dr. Ward Goodenough surveyed the Central Highlands in October, 1951, and from which a team of fieldworkers will shortly be sent.

Perhaps the main value of this book is that it deals with a complete presentation of different types of study in this complex pattern of neighbouring cultures. But, besides this, other questions of theoretical and practical importance are raised which must be discussed by all anthropologists interested in Melanesia.

—ADRIAN C. MAYER

March, 1954

"THE AUSTRALIAN WAY OF LIFE." Edited by George Caiger, under the auspices of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Pp. xvi and 158. Published by William Heinemann Ltd., 1953. Australian price, 15/6.

THIS is one of the Way of Life Series, prepared under the auspices of the International Studies Conference, on the request of and with the financial assistance of UNESCO. It is a welcome, though (a trifle) belated addition to the growing volume of contemplation by Australians of Australia. Some of the chapters were completed in substance nearer to 1949 than the date of issue, and the reader must allow for the historical water which has flowed under some of the bridges in these cases. It is well illustrated, though this reviewer finds it difficult to discover Gundagai in plate VIII B.

The seven chapters by various distinguished Australians provide in toto a readable account of some aspects of Australian life. The plan of the series does not permit a complete discussion of Australian culture. While, for example, there are numerous references to Australian literature and the other arts, there is, therefore, no separate treatment of our aesthetic performance and standards. This is a deficiency in the plan of the series and is not a valid criticism of this volume as such. However, the acute comments of Sir Frederic Eggleston on these matters (see particularly pp. 18-19) . . . "In the field of creative art the Australian record is also questionable" . . . only serve to whet the appetite for more.

The book opens with a pungent chapter by Sir Frederic Eggleston on "The Australian Nation." Mr. W. D. Borrie, after surveying the changing pattern of the Australian family, proceeds to an interesting discussion of how this institution functions in Australia, and of social policy in relation to it. Dr. K. S. Cunningham has managed by discriminating selection to give a general picture of the educational system. The political institutions of Australia are reviewed by Professor P. H. Partridge, particular attention being paid to the working of federation. The late Professor G. L. Wood writes about economic institutions, with stress upon "attitudes" and the changing pattern of economic control. There follows a remarkably penetrative and aptly phrased chapter by the Rev. K. T. Henderson, and Professor F. Alexander has some very interesting observations on Australians and the world, surveying the outlook of the denizens of this Ultima Thule upon the great globe itself.

There is, unfortunately, no index and no map, but nineteen illustrations enliven the discourses.

A slender volume imposes upon all contributors the tribulation of selection (and omission) of important aspects of Australian life. If some criticisms are offered on the score of issues not adequately taken up, they are offered rather to open up lines of inquiry which this volume suggests but does not pursue. In any case, the range of sociological research yet to be done upon even basic aspects of Australian life and development is literally enormous, and the "extra questions" can easily crowd in upon us, thick and fast. It would perhaps been wiser if all contributors had, as Mr. Borrie on the family does, stressed the lacunae in our knowledge more. Thus the results of our educational processes need more critical examination than they here receive. The chapter on economic institutions lacks sufficient indication of the growth of the economy, and of the interplay between this growth and our evolving institutions. Without the theme of growth and diversification of our economic life, the institutions of the economy are "six characters in search of an author" and are functioning in something of a vacuum. The working of federalism in Australia admittedly provides a convenient core for analysis of the working of our political institutions. The States, however, obstinately refuse to die, and though they dance increasingly to a Canberra measure, the detailed story, State by State, of the interplay between the growing Commonwealth power and the activities of the States, has yet to be written out. The States may not have their erstwhile power, but often act as if they appeared to have it—e.g., in determining developmental works programmes, and this imposes compromises and adjustments.

The internecine warfare over "priorities for works programmes" is a case in point. Professor Partridge has given us the macro-political story. What we will need is the micro-political story.

In relation to the Australian family, questions of tensions within it could do with more treatment. The relation of juvenile delinquency to the Australian family, and the role of changing sex mores to it, may bear further inquiry in this connection.

Quite the most stimulating of these chapters to this reviewer was Kenneth Henderson's treatment of Religious Institutions and Aspirations. Here occurs the summary and interesting judgment that "critical, impatient and limited realism is . . . the most distinctive trait in our Australian character." This contrasts with other views elsewhere in the volume—"a normal modern community—healthy, happy and vigorous," and (to quote Sir Frederic again), "he is sceptical, even cynical, and his humour is sardonic." The importance of Henderson's hypothesis is that he illustrates it with evidences, drawn from many fields of our life, including religion. "A realism of reconciliation" is seen as a basis for the future influence of Christianity on Australia. Perhaps Mr. Henderson could have told us more of the several modes of training of the Australian clerics.

Professor Alexander has drawn together a large number of examples to depict Australian attitudes to the world we live in. A small point may be mentioned here. Should the usage of referring to the "Chifley Labour Party" (p. 156) be adopted? This chapter stimulates further questionings. How far are Australian attitudes and external policies determined by the content of Australian education—e.g., the absence of formal training in Asian history, except as an appendage to European history, in the schools as a general rule? How is the paradox to be explained that though repeated statements are made of the significance of the Middle East to Australia, and though in two world wars Australian military forces have been engaged in this theatre, we are, as a people (and as a Parliament), deficient in the scholar of Islam, Arabic and the peoples of this area? Another question is what does the Australian "know" about foreign affairs? Quantitative tests in the U.S.A. revealed a startlingly low percentage of "informed" persons—even when the definition of "informed" was very easy-going. One wonders (and worries) about what the score would be here.

The book as a whole is readable, and within the limits of its coverage, provides a well-balanced picture of the Australian way. Bertrand Russell thought we were a nation of "doers" and felt impelled to stress the virtues of another, the contemplative way of life. After reading this volume one gathers he may be right.

—H. D. BLACK.

INSTITUTE NEWS

Editor's Notes

The Editor and Associate-Editors will at all times be interested to hear suggestions as to improvements in *The Australian Outlook*, and, in particular, to consider offers of material for publication.

The Editor desires to point out that in Dr. C. E. W. Bean's review article in the previous issue, a section of the concluding portion was telescoped into the body of the argument and readers are asked to note that the break occurs on page 228.

